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ABSTRACT:
The heart of this thesis is an interpretive rendition of a series of interviews conducted in
various departments of the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International
Development. These presentations are neither formated as quotations nor as excerpted
transcripts. They most definitely are .a'reporting exercise'.
They are a composite of very many things. Besides my personal interpretations of the
interviews, they include random snatches excerpted from conversation between the
respondent and colleagues who would pop their heads around the door during the
discussions, inferences drawn from telephone conversations that interrupted interviews,
observations drawn from the way in which different people interpreted the basic scenario I
presented them with at the start and how th.. chose to develop the subsequent
discussion, and inferences made about what people were actually saying and what they
really meant.
To that extent, at least, this part of the thesis is a personal account of a journey through
these two organizations. It is an image gleaned, nothing startling in itself perhaps, but
none the less a record of a passage through the labirynthine corridors of two international
development agencies engaged in the field of funding Urban shelter programs in
developing countries.
Essentially it is structured in three parts. The first introduces the origins of this thesis and
discusses some aspects of the "quantitative-qualitative" debate that purports to exist in
evaluative theory, arguing for a 'middle of the road' resolution. The second part of the
thesis is a presentation of my interpretations of the discussions that I had at the Bank and
at AID. This is presented more in the nature of a soliloquy, with an attempt to put myself in
the place of the interviewee, and resay what they said if I had said it. The concluding part
then takes a brief look at the theory behind institutional learning, and attempts to pull out
some of the issues that came out of the interviews, so as to come to a 'conclusion', not
necessarily a conclusive conclusion, but a presentation of the issues residual in my mind at
the end of this process.
This thesis has it's starting point in an interest in the field of evaluation. In the
process of enquiry into this field, in it's relationship to aspects of development
and shelter and the interventions driven primarily by international funding
agencies, certain shifts in perspective occurred. The initial focus of the enquiry
was intended to be on the various techniques of evaluation, with the intention of
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probing, first, for potential linkages between these techniques and the various
housing strategies I believed had been espoused over time by international donors.
Secondly, it was originally intended to seek to juxtapose the
quantitative-qualitative debate, and to enquire into the relative worth,
effectiveness, and contextual appropriateness of each. And finally, it was seen as a
vehicle to explore the myriad issues that surround the reality that is the act of
project evaluation.
In the process of delving into the labyrinthine corridors of the field, two things
happened. First came the realization, that technique, per se, is a meaningless
phenomenon. It does not matter how its done, what matters is why and for what
purpose. In that sense, at least, the end became more important than the means. It
was realized that the primary consequential reason for evaluation was to learn
lessons. Or conversely, that the only way to learn lessons was through some
process of evaluation, however it may be defined. This realization was followed by
a quick dip into literature on the various theories of organizational learning. But
soon enough, given the esotericity and jargon that veils much of such literarure, I
was led to question the purpose of institutional learning itself, which was seen to
be to improve the long term performance of the organization. This shifted the
focus of the thesis to the issue of organizational effectiveness.
iii
INTRODUCTION.
This thesis has two distinct points of origin. In the first place, there was my own interest with
the field of evaluation in the context of shelter interventions in developing countries. I
began with an enquiry into the various techniques of evaluation, the purposes for which
organizations conduct evaluations, the implications of such evaluative activities such as
the relationship between the cost and the worth of evaluation studies, and most important,
the quantitative-qualitative technique debate.
On the other hand, I began with an impression gained over the past two years through
courses, seminars, workshops and discussions with faculty here at M.I.T., that there had
been an evolution over time of the strategies espoused, in the field of shelter, by
international agencies such as the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International
Development.
The reason why I was more interested in looking as such organizations, as opposed to
some locally based implementation agency, was precisely because they were not locally
based. And it seemed to me that, being remote from their actual spheres of operation,
moving in and out of contexts, having a perspective that was global rather than regional,
somehow the criticality and worth of evaluations would have to have greater weight in order
for them to operate effectively.
The image I carried in my mind was that organizations such as these had, firstly, moved in
some sort of sequential way from initially supporting finished publc housing, to sponsoring
core housing, to advocating sites and services, to slum and squatter upgrading, to
unserviced site development, and then on to activities such as technical assistance
programs, institution building, municipal training and finance, privatization, policy reform
and culminating currently in a focus on urban land management and sector loans, to the
exclusion of previous strategies. One of the statements that stuck in my mind was that the
Bank, today, would not look sideways at a sites and services project, that it was a "bad
word" with them.
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The conception I had when I began to construct this thesis was that there had been an
evolution of strategies over time, which was a product of lessons learnt, that there had
been basic changes in policy and attitudes, an organizational evolution in fact.
At the same time I also had in mind a parallel scenario in the field of evaluation, where I
believed that there had been a similar movement from the number-crunching sort of
techniques such as operations research, cost-benefit analysis, and other
hypothetico-deductive paradigms, towards a more holistic-inductive approach
characterized by the broad field of qualitative evaluation, consisting of the
anthro-ethno-sociological techniques of observer participation, of participant observation,
of open ended interviews and so on. In short I believed that both in the field of shelter
intervention and in the field of the evaluation of such projects, there had been a parallel,
and possibly related movement towards the increasing despecification of the end-result
on an a-priori basis, or a de-prespecification of goals and outcomes and objectives.
I became curious about the possibility of any potential linkages between the two streams.
Had one been influenced to any degree by the other, were there any connections
between the two, and if there were, could it be inferred that the type of evaluation
techniques in use in the field of shelter interventions were in some way driven by, or linked
to, the shifts in strategies of intervention. Was there a possible linkage in these apparently
concurrent streams of development, and if so what would be the potential effects of such a
de-prespecification on the act of evaluation as it pertained to the fact of organizational
learning.
If, in initiating a project one leaves the goals open-ended, as for instance in the case of the
action planning mode of operation, can one go in subsequently to conduct a goal-free or
open-ended evaluation of the program and draw generalizable and substantially applicable
lessons from two such non-prespecified activities. Could organizations draw useful
lessons for future use under such overall conditions of uncertainty, or would their
effectiveness in the near future be impaired by these hypothesised developments.
This, of course, led me to the relativistic question of how effectively such organizations
had used evaluations ian the past to draw applicable lessons from previous projects. Did, in
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fact, the formal evaluations they had been conducting contribute to policy and strategy
shifts. If they did, what were the organizational linkages and internal mechanisms by which
such lesson learning occured. What were the controlling factors in enhancing
organizational effectiveness. And how would these linkages, mechanisms and factors be
affected by such a shift towards open-endedness. At this point I realized that I had moved
the focus of my thesis from a comprehensive study of the implications and the relative
merits and demerits of quantitative versus qualitative evaluation techniques and their
potential relationships to the evolving stream of shelter intervention strategies, to the
issue of organizational learning, and from there to questions about what drove, enhanced
or constrained the operational effectiveness of donor institutions.
I began, initially, by setting up a linear stream model of the three, inasmuch as I believed
that evaluations led to learning which, in turn, controlled effectiveness. But I then began to
wonder if the relationship, as it stood, may not be over-simplistic. Perhaps such a
rational-logical model was inadequate. Would it be more realistic to switch to the 'lateral
thinking' mode, as presented by De Bono, and envisage a more multiplex, multiplanar
relationship that might well prove to be more appropriate.
But it was a field of uncertainty. I had no way of knowing either how close theory and
practice were in reality, nor what the applicational relevance of such an enquiry might be.
The question foremost in my mind was that even if I could come to some 'academic'
conclusion about these issues, did It really matter.
So I decided that I would have to go out there and find out what the people actually
involved in these activities thought about the relevance of this relationship.
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METHODOLOGY.
Surprise, surprise..........................
There was once a man who lived in a country which had no fruit trees. This
man was a scholar and spent a great deal of time reading. In his readings he
often came across references to fruit. The descriptions of fruit were so
enticing that he decided to undertake a journey so that he could experience
fruit for himself.
He went to the market and asked everyone he met if they knew where he
could find fruit. After much searching he located a man who knew the
directions to the country and place where he could find fruit. The man drew
out elaborate directions for the scholar to follow.
With his map in hand, the scholar carefully followed all of the directions. He
was very careful to take all the right turns and to check out all of the landmarks
that he was supposed to observe. Finally, he came to the end of the
directions and found himself at the entrance to a large apple orchard. It was
springtime and the apple trees were in blossom.
The scholar entered the orchard and proceeded immediately to take one of
the blossoms and taste it. He liked neither the texture of the flower nor the
taste. He went to another tree and sampled another blossom, and then
another blossom, and another.
Each blossom, though quite beautiful, was distasteful to him. He left the
orchard and returned to his home country, reporting to his fellow villagers
that fruit was a much over-rated food. Being unable to recognize the
difference between the spring blossom and the summer fruit, the scholar
never realized that he had not experienced what he was looking for.
From THE PARABLES OF MULLAH NASSIRUDDIN SHAH.
The last thing I wanted to do was to set up a questionnaire, to predetermine the direction
the interviews should take. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, I intended to interview
a cross-section of people at the Bank and AID, at different levels, in different positions,
with different mind-sets, so that I could get a holistic impression of organizational opinions.
Secondly, there were so many ambiguities in my mind that I could not decide what may or
may not be significant.
I could, of course, have taken a random, if uninformed, decision to focus in on one or two
apparentl essential points, but I decided to approach the interviews in an exploratory state
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of mind, and first see what thev had to say. I decided that, not knowing these people,
where they came from, what their backgrounds and experiences were, perhaps I should
go in there, lay out a skeletal scenario for them, give them a minimal idea of where my
enquiry was emanating from, the least necessary background information, and then play
each interview by the ear.
The essence of the qualitative mode of research, after all, is to not begin the enquiry with a
well formulated rational-deductive hypothesis that one then goes out to test. Of course
there has to be some form of structure to the enquiry, but this is more in the nature of a
general interest in an issue. It could even be a very tightly structured hypothesis that one
formulates at the start, but on entering the actual field of enquiry, one needs to revert to a
state of mind that precludes preconceptions that might bias or color the sort of questions
one asks, or the interpretations one makes.
One needs to maintain an almost child-like outlook that enables one to transend the initial
focus of the enquiry, to flow with the streams of information that impinge themselves on
the enquirer during the course of the enquiry, to respond to the respondent rather than to
lead him up the path you have already mapped out in your mind. At all costs one must
avoid, or at least try to avoid, the quicksand trap of 'the loaded question'.
Human nature being what it is, people will, up to a point at least, tend to tell you what taly
tin you want to hear, to convey to you a picture of themselves or their view on issues that
they feel will show them up in what they think you think is the best light. 'The truth' is a very
elusive concept, subject to much interpretation and personal perceptions. Not only does
one person's vision of reality differ from another's, the same person's perceptions of what
is correct or right or true will vary from one situation to another.
My whole approach to the interviews I conducted at the Bank and at AID, to the manner in
which I present them here, grows out of this sort of mindset. This in turn is the product of
three influences. Partly it is the result of my readings into qualitative evaluation and open
ended interview techniques, partly a result of my experiences with radio journalism (where
one has to go out, often at the spur of the moment, to record an event or activity that one
may have little personal knowledge of, and hence no preconceptions about), and partly a
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result of my own past experiences both in filling in and in setting up the conventional
yes-no or scale-of-five type of questionaires.
The cut and dried, black and white approach of such enquiries has always left me
dissatisfied. When I fill in such a survey or opinion poll, I always get the feeling that what my
answers convey is never what I really feel. Most of the time I feel tempted to either answer
yes-but or no-but or even yes-and-no-but. Patton, in his Qualitative Evaluation Methods,
illustrates this point very strongly with two different evaluation studies of a newly
implemented system of accountability in the school system in Kalamazoo, Michigan, where
the results of two different parts of a study, one using a standardized criterion performance
format and the other using open ended questions, had dramatically different effects upon
the authorities who wished to use the evaluation. It was easy for them to rationalize a
rejection of the findings of the former, but when faced with the latter they had to accept the
real implications of the program.
When I collate data from questionaires that I have designed, I always wonder what the
respondent really meant. The drawback of qualitative evaluation is, of course, that it
generates the sort of information that does not lend itself very easily to statistical
manipulations. But if one seeks a holistic picture of a particular world, when one adopts the
doctrine of verstehen, when the issue is understanding, what price numbers? For 'truth' Is
a many-faceted phenomenon that must be seen to be seen if it is to be seen at all, else it
will never be seen.
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a beatitude for evaluation Interviewing.........
Ask.
Listen and record.
Ask.
Listen and record.
Ask.
Listen and record.
It is a privilege to listen. To ask is a grave responsibility.
Evaluators, listen.
Do you not know that you shall be evaluated by your questions?
To ask is to seek entry into another's world.
Therefore ask respectfully and with sincerity. Do not waste questions
on trivia and tricks, for the value of the answering gift you
receive will be a reflection of the value of your question. Blessed are
the skilled questioners, for they shall be given mountains
of words to ascend.
Blessed are the wise questioners, for they shall unlock hidden
corridors of knowledge.
Blessed are the listening questioners, for they shall gain perspective.
From Halcolm's Evaluation Beatitudes. (Patton, 1980).
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PREAMBLE.
The heart of this thesis, as it now stands, is an interpretive rendition of a series of
interviews conducted in various departments of the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for
International Development. These presentations are neither formated as quotations nor as
excerpted transcripts. They most definitely are =I a'reporting exercise'.
They are a composite of very many things. Besides my personal interpretations of the
interviews, they include random snatches excerpted from conversation between the
respondent and colleagues who would pop their heads around the door during the
discussions, inferences drawn from telephone conversations that interrupted interviews,
observations drawn from the way in which different people interpreted the basic scenario I
presented them with at the start and how U=y chose to develop the subsequent
discussion, and inferences made about what people were actually saying and what they
really meant.
To that extent, at least, this part of the thesis is a personal account of a journey through
these two organizations. It is an image gleaned, nothing startling in itself perhaps, but
none the less a record of a passage through the labirynthine corridors of two international
development agencies engaged in the field of funding Urban shelter programs in
developing countries.
Essentially it is structured in three parts. The first introduces some aspects of the
"quantitative-qualitative" debate that purports to exist in evaluative theory, arguing for a
'middle of the road' resolution. The second part of the thesis is a presentation of my
interpretations of the discussions that I had . This is presented more in the nature of a
soliloquy, with an attempt to put myself in the place of the interviewee, and resay what they
said if I had said it. The concluding part then takes a brief look at the theory behind
institutional learning, and attempts to pull out some of the issues that came out of the
interviews, so as to come to a 'conclusion', not necessarily a conclusive conclusion, but a
presentation of the issues residual in my mind at the end of this process.
The single most significant thing about this thesis is probably the fact that it does not begin
with a set of hypotheses that it then seeks to test. The research on which this thesis rests
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is conducted in the spirit of open minded enquiry. I had attempted, at the start, to structure
a researchable hypothesis, in the rational-logical hypothetico-deductive mode. I found that
to be a very difficult process for me. I could not convince myself on the appropriateness or
validity of such a mode of enquiry. Thus it was that I approached the interviews that I had
conceived of as a sour for potential hypotheses. I had hoped that, somehow, they
would show me the way towards rationally structuring my thesis. I found, instead, a beehive
of issues that I now feel compelled to present exactly as they registered upon me, in the
hope that they would serve as building blocks, both for myself and possibly for others, in
future research.
There is certainly more to the presentation of these interviews than will probably meet the
eye. They are the product of considerable research, both into developmental literature in
the field of shelter and in the fields of qualitative and quantitative evaluation techniques. It
most certainly is most strongly influenced by researches into qualitative evaluation
literature. Much as I would have liked to include sone inkling of the whole world that has
opened up for me as a result of my enquiry, I regret that, for myself, I must leave that for
some other venture, and for the reader,......well, the spirit of enquiry lives on. In our minds,
if nowhere else. I can only hope that the mode in which the interviews are presented will
suggest, to some extent at least, the depth of the vision on which I believe they are built.
For the rest, I think they must speak for themselves, both as an evaluation of a field and as
a source of insight into the ramificated workings of the organizational mind.
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HALCOLM'S EVALUATION LAWS.
on conceptual Issues In qualitative evaluations........
- Conceptualizing an evaluation depends on understanding
self-interest: yours and theirs. Useful evaluations put theirs
first. Then there are the others..........
- Hennes' Lament: Evaluators do IT under difficult circumstances.
- The scientific status of a methodological approach has nothing to
do with its appropriatemess. And vice versa.
- Evaluation is too serious a matter to be done by someone who has
never been a client in a program.
- An evaluation not worth doing is not worth doing well.
on strategies and research designs.......
- Evaluation results always make clear to people what they had
really wanted to know but forgot to ask.
- Every evaluation serves a purpose, even if it is only to be a
horrible example to others.
- The perfect evaluation design isn't.
- The Law of Divine Intervention: . All skill is in
vain when an angel pees in the touchhole of your musket (English
translation. Peers and Bennet, 1979).
on collecting qualitative data.....
- Always be suspicious of data collection that goes according to plan.
- Research subjects have also been known to be people.
- The evaluator's scientific observation is some person's real-life
experience. Respect for the latter must preceed respect for the
former.
- Evaluators must be presumed guilty until proven innocent.
- Make sure, when you yeild to temptation in the field, that it
appears to have something to do with what you are studying.
- Always carry extra batteries and getaway money.
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INTERVIEW #1.
on learning lessons............
It is not enough for the Bank to learn lessons from its projects. There are other actors in
the process, both local institutions and private organisations who must agree with the
lessons learnt before effective action can be taken. After all the World Bank is not an
implementation organization.
on building consensus............
There is an international community of knowledge that grows beyond the Bank, and
consensus must grow throughout this community before it can be effective. It cannot be
an isolated internal process.
For example, in Indonesia, the approach adopted was to get tiem to conduct the
studies that led to the drafting of the TOR. This had two advantages: first, it helped build
local expertise; second, it helped eliminate internal preconceptions, and helped us to
learn from them as much as we were trying to pass on our body of knowledge to them.
One of the Bank's tasks has to be to initiate the formation of, and the consolidation of, an
international consensus.
on the transfer of Information............
Within the Bank, the most effective way real information gets transmitted, is by personal
contacts, informal networking, word of mouth.
The circulation of the Appraisal Reports is, in itself, not very important. Informal
communications are much more effective than official memos. "When a report crosses
my desk, and I feel I have something important to say, I would never write a memo about
it, but would call up the person concerned and meet over lunch, or write the person an
informal note making my point. If I used formal memos, it would either get lost in the
network, or get shelved."
The problem with the formal review process is that it is, by its nature constrained. Not
only is there the problem of the time lag, which ineffectuates it, but there is also a high
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cost tag built into the process.
The dissemination of information, or beliefs, of such nature may be done through very
many ways. In working with local institutions, one can push one's point of view. One
publishes papers, both in publications within the Bank and in outside publications,
giving details of such results in the hope that it will lodge within the international body of
knowledge.
on the nature of change............
Within the Urban Division at the Bank, changes are most often incremental in nature.
Few things fall out of the sky. Shifts are normally marginal, to the extent that occasionally
it could be just a change in the name of a particular strategy or approach. Certainly, there
are very few drastic shifts in direction.
It is not important to come up with pathbreaking ideas. Most of what is said within the
Division can be found elsewhere (not necessarily because it was drawn from the
outside, but because there are marginal ideas that become apparent with time.) It may be
enough to take old ways, tinker with them, think of new applications or new ways to
package them, and very often new insights drop out of this process.
Amongst the staff at the Bank, there are very few original thinkers. Most often there is
only marginal tinkering, or at best, the imaginative application of old or tested ideas.
The importance of marginal changes is that they are simply a better way of doing things
than before. Perfection is not the issue. Only, how can we improve performance relative
to what happened before.
on lessons learnt............
There is a very real need within the Division to corelate information beyond context
specific studies, so as to be able to generalize across regions. For example, the
affordability studies and the econometric research conducted by the Policy Division on a
cross-contextual basis show quite clearly that the use of 25% of household income as a
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rule of thumb to measure affordability is not justifiable. As a consequence of the
research, a software package is being developed to help generate context-specific
affordability criteria. One can punch in the level of income in a country, the population in
a particular city, readily available macro-numbers, then what part of the income
distribution one wants to focus on, and the program delivers figures on affordability.
Housing markets do work in predictable ways in developing countries, that one can do
the kind of market analysis that has been done in developed countries in developing
countries and sucessfully analyse the data and determine what the expenditure patterns
are. There are patterns that are consistent from place to place. Demand Is income
inelastic within cross-sections, within markets, that low income people systematically pay
higher fractions of their incomes for shelter than higher income people within any city. At
the same time, across cities, there is another pattern. The more developed an urban
settlement, the greater the percentage of their income people within that city will pay
towards shelter irrespective of income bracket.
Demand is very, very much more elastic in the long run than it is in the short run. But on
the basis of this research, it was possible to say that even though the assumption that
people spend 25% of their income on housing was not a bad assumption for some
places, it could not be universally applied to every context. Even within a particular Urban
context, there were likely to be variations in spending pattems across income segments.
But such research is slow and time consuming. This study took two years to run and two
years to confirm, so it took four years to come up with information that could be
confidently disseminated within and without the Bank.
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INTERVIEW #2.
on the evolution of strategies.............
The Bank was approached in the late '60s on whether it would be interested in getting
involved in housing. At that time AID was building MIG housing in Latin America, the
Commonwealth Corporation was building walkups, mostly in Anglophone Africa and
South Asia. The Bank was very unwilling to get involved in shelter because by then it
was clear that most projects were benefiting middle- and upper-income groups. So a
formal evaluation study was done by Grindley and Merrill, which led to their Sector Policy
paper of 1972. That led to the Urbanization Policy paper by Dunkerley in 1975, which
translated that into an economic policy framework. These papers laid out the frameworks
within which the Bank would be prepared to discuss housing projects with countries
which expressed an interest.
The Urbanization paper went to the Board of the Bank in June of '72, at the same time as
the Senegal project, which was the first sites and services project, was requested by
their Government. The paper and the project were approved with the caveat that a
Housing Policy framework be developed. But there was no organizational experience at
that time, which led to the formal adoption of the Learning By Doing strategy, which was
articulated as such, and had a very tentative structure.
At the outset, there was a study done of housing policies extant in four cities, namely
Bogota, Ahmedabad, Kuala Lumpur and Nairobi, in an effort to understand what was
currenly happening out there, what the existing problems were, and what possibly
could be done to ameliorate conditions.
The whole idea behind Sites and Services was to lift the financial burden of housing
from the public sector and shift it to self-help efforts in the field of housing. But what was
put in place was a management intensive, institutional intensive mechanism. For
example the S&S Directorate in Djakarta, which started out with five people, ended up
being two hundred people. So then the question is, was it worth it to create more public
sector employment, public sector delivery systems to produce these kinds of projects.
Was it cost effective?
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There is, within the Bank, the concept of generations of projects. The first generation of
projects was from '72 to '76, which was straight sites and services. The second
generation of projects includes more upgrading projects. Then there is the third
generation of projects, begining in the early '80s which began to introduce the concept
of urban management. But, there is a very important point to be kept in mind here. For
example, when the Bank did it's first project in Burundi in 1979, it was discovered that
the same issues that had been dealt with in Kenya in the mid-70s, the sites and services
issues, the low cost shelter issues, the standards issues, all had to be dealt with first.
There was a real need to repeat the project formulations of the '70s in the '80s in a new
country. But this was complemented by what had been learnt. So even though the
Burundi project has mainly a shelter component, it doe. include urban management.
But it is still a third generation project that is very similar to the first generation ones.
Basic strategy changes take place fundamentally through discussion. People go out
there, try to do things a certain way, begin to ask questions, begin to raise new issues.
Strategy changes, in part come from enterprising project officers who come up with new
formulations for projects. Braz Menezes goes to Mexico and insists that what's needed
is a municipal training project and not sites and services, that that's the priority and what
the Bank should focus on for now. Occasionally change is driven by the formal
evaluations and papers, when enough people begin talking about and writing about an
jdia. And then, even though Urban has moved to regional divisions, the Central
Department begins to shift its criteria on what is good work, and begins to call for more
attention to management and maintenance, financial viability, and so on.
So shifts in emphasis were driven by two things. First, because there were the lessons
learnt in the field, and second, because of the realization that even though the projects
were low cost in terms of what they cost the household, the countries could not afford
extensive delivery systems. This called for a focus on resource mobilization and
management.
And then there was the oil crisis. For example in Senegal, the first sites and services
project, between the start of the project in 1972 and when it was almost done in 1979,
the fuel bills had increased to 50 times what it had been. Countries that had little problem
15
with debt were suddenly shot into the red. That led to major concerns with
macro-economic issues, both in the Central Department at the Bank and, more
importantly, in Governments throughout the world.
on the application of evaluation............
When the Senegal project went before the Board of the Bank, questions were raised
there whether the project would be able to achieve it's stated goals, and whether it might
not cause incidental problems such as increased migration. McNamara promised the
Board that there would be a set of formal evaluations on four pilot sites to study these
issues.
These were intended to be very rigorous evaluations. But, with hindsight, the whole
process was misunderstood. A methodology of baseline surveys was set up to study
family situations and what would happen to them two years and five years down the line.
But project start-up time was completely ignored. So teams would go out there on
schedule, and find nothing on the site.
By the late seventies, early eighties, the results of the formal evaluations on El Salvador,
Lusaka, Nairobi, and and so on, were starting to come in. But they had been too slow,
and taken too much time, and proved too costly. By that time the product at the Bank
had already changed. It had already been recognized that sites and services, as a
shelter strategy, would not reach the poorest of the poor because of problems with
income levels, affordability, cost recovery, even though the 'Turner hypothesis' on self
help was largely validated and the reports did show that enough people, for example in
Lusaka, did build for themselves, or at least enough of them to make the idea workable.
But with an emphasis on the very poor, the strategy within the Bank by the late
seventies/early eighties shifted increasingly towards urban upgrading as a more
appropriate way to reach the lower percentiles.
Does this mean lessons had already been learnt before the formal studies?Then, to a certain
extent it may be said that the formal evaluations coincided with this shift in direction, rather than
causing It, in which case, did the formal reports themselves, lead to learning or not? But perhaps
the process of preparing/compiling these reports may have had its own influence upon the
organization.
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On the evaluation side, the Bank has certainly learnt that the heavily quantitative
evaluation techniques of the types outlined in Bamberger's report, is far too expensive.
They have a very low professional credibility, and are primarily of interest to the academic
world, but not to us. The question then is not so much how to learn, but how to ensure
that continued discussion is sustained. Pieces of work like Larry Salmen's, on
Participatory Observation, can be very helpful If Bank people will read It. The fact is that
the way professional life in the Bank is organized, everybody works too hard and travels
too much. So the major question in this regard is, can people keep up with the flow of
formal information given the bureaucratic demands on their time. Very often the burden
of required activities makes reflection impossible.
But the other issue in this regard is that evaluations can be very controversial. For
example Steve Mayo's finding that subsidies have in fact not been reduced as a result of
the projects, was unacceptable within policy circles. In some ways, being an operational
organization, we sometimes get a response that we don't even want to hear about.
There is no question that informal evaluation is far more conducive to learning. It is
extremely rare to get massive changes in the paradigm as a result of the formal studies.
In fact the Bank's approach has been changing through a case-law approach which
involves short feedback loops, informal evaluations.
on lesson learning..............
Initially, the learning process had a very short feedback loop. Project officers could not
afford to wait however many years until the project was completed. So part of the
learning happened well before projects were finished, but at the same time people were
looking at what was happening around them in those countries in other housing
programs, and feeding that information directly into their project reports.
If one lines up the 60 or so projects between '72 and '82, one would see that there were
a number of refinements that occured. The way in which land, renting, selection criteria,
and so on were treated, became more operational. The interesting thing is that most of
this evolved without ever having a project completed. It was more a process of thinking
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through, rather than because of evidence from the field.
[if this is the case, how can one possibly believe that formal evaluations have anything to do do
with the 'lessons' organizations learn. Then the process must be driven from some other source].
on lessons learnt.............
In the first dozen projects, one of the questions was "should renting be allowed, and
should income from renting be built into the affordability calculations so as to allow
slightly bigger plots and slightly bigger houses". There was much discussion in the
context of the Dandura project in Kenya, where it was concluded that since that was the
natural pattern in Nairobi it should be taken into account. That had a dramatic effect on
affordability issues in the context of Kenya, but It did not happen In very many other
projects.
[Does that mean that a lesson was learnt but did not find application within the organizational
culture, or was it just a contextual phenomenon].
Another issue was the resale of plots or units. Initially there was a rule that recipients
could not sell their plots or units for a minimum of five years. The question was, first,
whether it was controllable and did it make economic sense, and second, was it sensible
to try to control such resale of plots. The final consensus was that if the issue was to
reach the poor, perhaps it was valid to allow resale as a way to boost the economic status
of the lowest income groups.
By 1980 or so the whole S&S paradigm, which undoubtedly had changed over time,
began to be called into question. All the projects that began in the early '70s were
beginning to finish, and the project completion reports started coming in. One of the
main issue's that emerged was that there were whole areas that had been ignored; for
example the field of operations and maintenance once the project was in place. You
build a neighbourhood and come back ten years later and find that nobody is cleaning
the streets, or removing the garbage. Part of the problem was that the Bank was
concentrating on working with only those organizations or institutions that were
interested in low-income housing, and was ignoring the municipal institutions and their
framework.
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[But if it was the project completion reports that led to these realizations, then can one say that
formal evaluations do not lead to lesson learning, or does one conclude that learning is a mix of
formal and informal evaluations, and that it is not possible to compartmentalize them, that it is not
possible to predict what mix of organizational learning and individual learning makes for the best
scenario].
Then there is the issue of training. In a program in francophone Africa, for example, it was
found that 2 out of 30 housing directors and project directors on Bank financed
projects could calculate either inflation or interest payments. That led, in part, to the
realization that the training element was critical, that there was a whole body of people
out there who treated the project appraisals as being written in stone, when they were
meant to be indicative rather than detailed blueprints. Interestingly enough, there was
not such a problem in the Anglophone countries.
Then there was the issue of the shortage of land. So the whole process of land
acquisition, and land development and land markets began to become critical. Going
into the '80s a little more, it was realized that, even though the projects had included
construction loans, this component didn't really relate to the housing finance system of
the countries. So, more attention needed to be paid to housing finance.
After 1980 and having run all these projects, it was recognized that replicability did not
mean doing more of the same thing. There began to be people saying, well, now that
we've raised the issue of urban maintenance and operations, that takes us into municipal
finance, whether these municipalities have the cash and expertise to operate and
maintain this infrastructure. And then people began to say, maybe housing isn't the
priority. For instance, the West Africa division has decided that housing is irrelevant, that
the concentration has to be municipal maintenance and infrastructure development.
In India for instance, even though in the Madras project sites and services and slum
upgrading was the major component, there were projects in Calcutta and Indore and
Bhilai where the focus was on urban services. The question here was, what was the
municipal framework, was Indore able to finance its own infrastructure, did it have a
revenue base, which is a different set of questions.
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on organizational effectiveness............
By 1980, the Bank had worked in about 35 countries. There were no misconceptions
about the extent of impact the projects had had on the extent of the problem, having
reached a mere 11 million beneficiaries. But it certainly began to be possible to design
programs to actually reach the poor, the program in Indonesia, the basti improvement
program in Calcutta with 2 million people both worked reasonably well, and there were
projects in Djakarta and Tanzania and so on. And then there was the transfer of
information internationally, and a lot of the approaches were adopted by AID and by
other agencies, creating a new orthodoxy.
By then there was the realization that even though one could get Sites and Services
and Slum Upgrading projects to work, they had certain problems; there were the issues
of cost recovery, of the level of standards used, the question of whether economically
driven design standards were in fact appropriate, because the whole move was driven
by economists rather than the coloured pens of the architects. But, in effect, a product
had been defined. And this was acknowledged by a number of institutions, but they
questioned a number of factors, such as the issue of speed of implementation, the
issue of cost, the issues of effort.
There was no question that serviced sites, or even unserviced sites are the cheapest
way to deliver shelter to the poor. The dilemma was, how can it be done on a large
enough scale to actually have an impact. Part of the Bank's solution to that has been
attempts to prove that sites and services does work econically. and that the private
sector, or at least non-governmental organizations can make a reasonable profit on such
projects. In the post '80s, the Bank has been realizing IRR's of 20%.
on organizational change.............
The major thing that's happened in the last five years is that the key people who used to
work on the Urban Division no longer work on Urban. People who were experienced in
the '70s in the process, Jaycocks who was the director, Churchill who followed him as
director, have moved to other things. Jaycocks is now the VP for East Africa, Churchill
now works on Energy, people like Madavo who is the Division chief for Africa and still
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works in Africa but not on Urban, Sandstrom who handled South Asia now works in
Africa, and many new people have come into the activity who have no background in
Urban issues. So there has, in some sense, been a dilution, a loss of leaming, certainly a
loss of experienced people. I worked on Urban for the past fifteen years, and now I work
in Pakistan with very little Urban bias.
So there has been a lot of loss in learning. And under the upcoming reorganization,
what is expected is that WSUD will be merged with Infrastructure more generally,
including Transportation and Energy. So one can expect a significant drop in Urban
interventions in the Bank projects. There may be a lot of projects, but they will leach on
to other primary components, and certainly the Urban identity within the Bank will
become muted.
The rationale behind the reorganization is that the Bank needs to be more repnive to
individual country needs, and therefore the sectoral point of view Is seen to be less
Important than the country point of view. That's partly due to what the countries
themselves have been saying, and certainly what the stockholders have been saying. In
1986, the five major stockholders on the Board of the Bank abstained on the budget,
which is extraordinary. The message, then, is that the Bank needs to be leaner and more
efficient. But whether reorganization necessarily means efficiency, is a moot point.
[Does this suggest the Bank in fact is on the verge of moving way from Sector loans to an even
larger perspective of country loans, that their scale of focus is still broadening?]
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INTERVIEW #3.
on lesson learing.............
Probably the most critical determinant of what happens to learnt lessons within an
organisation like the Bank, is the distribution of power between the technical and the
administrative staff; does the bureaucracy control directions or does field experience
lead the policy.
There are probably at least two reasons why it has taken so long for lessons to trickle up
through the Bank. The first is essentially the inertia factor. People are just simply used to
doing things in a certain way. They feel more comfortable doing the things they know.
There is a resistance to change that is inherent in organizations worldwide. There is an
economic and psychological stake in maintaining the status quo. Which leads to the
second probable reason; that it is not enough for people within the Bank to learn
lessons. Once these lessons have been leamt, they then have to be transmitted
through the whole international network of implementor institutions.
on the transfer of lessons............
So there were three things that were done. First the Bank mounted a massive research
program which churned out reams of paper, and which did help to 'spread the word'.
Second, there was a massive effort to lobby various development agencies to bring
them to see that perhaps this was a better way to do things. And one of the ways,
thirdly, to do that was to initially do small-scale demonstration and pilot projects in an
effort to build both consensus and local experience.
It is important to keep in mind that a lot of what the Bank was pushing for in the field of
Urban was very contrary to what had previously been going on in most of the countries.
For example, in India there was only one housing finance institution, HUDCO, which was
busy dumping the miserable few resources it had into high-cost, heavily subsidized,
upper income housing. At that time HUDCO probably was financing perhaps 3% of the
marginal need for housing in urban areas nationally, and it was all going into the top of
the income distribution. And then the Bank comes along and says, this is all wrong, the
people most in need are below the 60th and 70th percentile of the population, most of
whom live in slums; that the product is much too costly, that instead of 70,000 rupees it
22
should be in the order of 5,000, and that instead of providing housing we should be
providing the item that is on the critical path: namely serviced land.
on organizational structure............
The other issue is whether there is continuity, both politically and administratively within
the institution. If in the IAS, or the Bank, the typical officer does not hold a job for more
than two or three years, and the typical life span of a project is more like ten years, there
are two implications. Firstly, there is no way for the officer, who may have a vast fund of
professional experience, to effectively implement his or her vision of the direction the
project should take, and secondly, there is no effective way to institute accountability,
and thus responsibility.
Every idea has it's time and place. But the Urban Division is definitely not a 'typical' World
Bank operation, in the sense that the kind of projects we have been doing are not
'normal' Bank projects. The essential difference is probably that Urban projects are much
more site specific than Infrastructure projects like water, and sewage and power and
dams, which are hard capital investments of the kind that the Bank had much experience
with. But Urban projects were a new field for the Bank, and there was much casting
about to try to figure out what the approach should be. The other factor is probably that it
was recognized early on that the technical and philosophical state of mind just did not
exist ou t there, and needed to be created before anything appropriate could be done.
on the evolution of strategIes...........
There is an interactive relationship between a number of things; first there is what the
Bank thinks it ought to be doing, second, there is what the country in in which the Bank
is working thinks the Bank should be doing, and thirdly there is the individual
experience. the personal philosophy of the particular project officer involved - because
one of the strengths of the Bank is that the project officers have an incredible amount of
autonom yto develop the project as they see fit, given the place and the time, and finally
there is the circumstantial composite of the particular cast of actors involved in the
specific interaction and what they bring to bear upon the project.
Initially, or at least primarily, the Bank saw it's role as the rationalization of urban
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investments rather than the direct provision of shelter, as aiding the development of
urban economies. We've always known that working in Urban would involve us in a
whole range of things such as transportation, and water and sewage. The Bank has, of
course, been doing all these things, but almost completely as an independent item. It
still supports isolated interventions of this sort, without seeing them as a supportive
machinery for the urban planning process, but less than before. Looking back, it would
seem to be a mixed bag. Some projects have been 'christmas trees', in the sense that
they had a whole range of urban services, while other projects were self-standing shelter
projects of one sort or another.
Of course, when the Bank first got involved in shelter projects, it did not have an agenda
that focused on the poverty concerns specifically. It was only after 1973 that it became
concerned about who the recipients specifically were, and who was actually going to
benefit from projects funded by the Bank. And even though this whole concept of '
banking on the poor' is normally linked to McNamara, it was happening generally too,
within the international community.
So there was a general movement away from looking merely at gross efficiency Issues,
towards a recognition that one could not look at growth in isolation from the equity
Issues. There grew a question of who benefits from these projects.
Take a typical water and sanitation project prior to the '70s, and it really concerned itself
only with expansion of supply, large network development, focuses on per capita
availability, largely a concern with traditional rate of returns and long-term master plans.
But until then, there was little concern with issues such as availability of resources,
whether fiscal or institutional, or with issues of benefits to different classes of people,
and the indirect or intangible effects of projects - which led to different ways of looking at
evaluation.
The progression of strategy-shifts in the Bank's projects is not easily discernible,
because there were any number of cross-connections country-wise. But, sites and
sevices was certainly one of the earliest components of the Bank's urban packages.
Then, to that was added low-cost water and sanitation. And then, one of the other early
24
concepts was in the transport field, when the Bank pushed the maximizing of capital
investment in urban transportation. Very much later, there was the concept of municipal
management. There was talk about solid waste management, some conditionalities
about municipalities being required to maintain systems. Perhaps what the Bank didn't
do initially, which maybe it should have done, was to look at the cost of maintenance of
projects that had been put in place. If it had, the chances are that it would have begun to
concentrate much earlier on the burden projects placed on municipalities.
It's not that there were no people in the Bank who saw this phenomenon. If one looks at
the Bombay urban transportation project, which began early in 1973, there were Indians
at the Bank who recognized and and pointed out the fact there were a whole bunch of
agencies investing all over the place in a totally uncoordinated fashion, with no common
objectives, in fact no real objectives at all. There was a total mismatch between the total
estimated investment package and the resources on the one side, and what people did
and the defined social objectives on the other.
But by and large, the Bank did anticipate most of the developments that have taken
place over the past 15 years. It is not that the Bank is moving away from sites and
services, but that it no longer sees the need to involve itself in the sort of small-scale
pilot type of projects that it used to in the past, from small actions in a single city, and is
moving towards the state-wide financing by national institutions of what has proven,
through the small pilot-scale projects over the past decade, to be a highly successful
strategy.
on the Implementation of strategies.............
But the important point here is that the Bank was essentially sending out signals that
"you're doing it all wrong, and here's how you should be doing it. And when you do that
in a large country like India, you're really telling the heads of major agencies, all the
engineers, the administrators, don't do what you've been doing all along, because you
don't know what you're doing." That has to cause a fair amount of resentment, and
everybody,everywhere has perfectly understandable psychological and financial stakes
in doing things the way they've always done them.
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Ideally, what one would like is to start from the top, and get the governments to change
whole policies and get everybody in all the national institutions to change their policies,
and have a simultaneous nation-wide impact. But the people at the top are no different
in nature than the people at the bottom or the middle, who prefer to be doing what
they've been doing best. So the first need was to try to get a toe in the door somehow.
That might explain why the initial projects tended to be rather small in the first place, and
secondly to be located in particular cities, which in fact were chosen because they
appeared to have institutions that were maximally receptive to the concepts the Bank
had espoused as a result of it's preliminary reseach. There was no way of setting up any
national or regional or state or even city-wide project orientation. Initially there was no
question of even attempting to bring about fundamental policy changes in, say, land
development.
There had to be a series of little demonstration projects first, in order to build up
sufficient hands-on experience in the field, in effect to generate sufficient proselytes
who would spread the word. It was never expressed that way explicitly, but that's the way
it turned out. So we started out, say, with Madras 1, which had 13,000 sites and services
plots and took five years to implement. That's 2000 plots a year where the marginal
demand is something like 20,000 a year in Madras alone. So the impact from the
numbers point of view was not very significant. But from a psychological and InstItutional
point of view, it could be argued that the impact was phenomenal.
Most importantly, a lot of prejudices about implementation were broken down. A lot of
people at the engineering level, at the management level, and even the public, got
exposed to these 'new' concepts. Previous to this the general attitude was that sites
and services was equivalent to organized slums. But then, as a result of the Bank
initiated projects, perceptions changed. It was proved that it Is possible to get full cost
recovery for example. There was a whole body of engineers who not only learnt to
design such projects, but also changed their preconceptions about what minimal
standards ought to be applied.
Now there are whole agencies that have had the experience of implementing these
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kinds of projects throughout the state. So given such a critical mass of ideas there are
any number of people out there who understand these ideas, not in an academic sense
but in an implementational mode. The important issue here was the building up of critical
mass. The ideas were all there, it just needed enough people accepting them before
they could be implemented effectively.
on the periodic transfer of personnel............
If one stays in one country over a long period of time, one gets a true sense of the
cultural structure, of the strengths an weaknesses of the society, of what is possible and
what is not possible without having to demand major changes in the existing framework
of institutions. Otherwise there is a problem with continuity. With new people and new
ideas, as with new policy, there is always the problem of maintaining a critical mass of
people who understand and begin to agree with existing policies.
For example, once a contract bidding document is in place, one seeks to modify and
improve it to make it more effective. On another scale, there is the issue of negotiation. If
a project officer is 'in place' for five or ten years, watching shifting trends within the
political scenarios of the country, meeting constantly with both the technical personnel
and with the politicians who come and go, that project officer is much better placed in
terms of professional effectiveness, because he or she begins to understand much
better how 'the system' works.
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INTERVIEW #4.
on the evolution of strategies............
In the mid- and late- '60s, a number of countries began to raise the issue of shelter in
Bank-related projects. The bank was, of course, working on urban issues, but these
were almost completely related to infrastructure and services. It was realized early on that
if the Bank tried to fund finished housing, there just wouldn't be enough money to go
around. At that time there probably only two urban planners working within the Bank.
Also, a lot of people, both within the Bank and in the countries concerned were
begining to become aware of John Turners work, and wondering if that might not be
one way of going about adressing the issue of shelter.
There was a study conducted by Grindley and Merryl of Berkley at that time, which put
together the existing body of knowledge and tried to set policies for the Bank's
interventions in the field of shelter. Essentially it was an attempt to devise potential ways
to maximise the utilization of resourses.
Senegal was the first sites and services project that was initiated as a result of this study.
There are two possible ways of looking at why Senegal was picked as the starting place,
and they are both arguable. On the one hand, even though a lot of people at the Bank
might deny this, the Bank has always had a problem with working in the francophone
countries - partly because of the language, and partly because the American style of
management is so very different. In any case, the francophone countries have never
been high on the Bank's list of activities.
The second argument, which may be more likely, is that Senegal was probably one of
the few countries that was, on it's own initiative, already doing something in the nature of
sites and services. Of course one of the reasons why this was happening was that there
was a massive relocation of slum dwellers to summarily equipped sites, (slum clearance?)
to the outskirts of Djakarta going on at that time. But they were bulldozing the previous
sites to make way for highrise development, which was antithetical to what the Bank was
advocating at that time. It certainly was not rooted in issues such as cost recovery, or
optimal resource utilization, or any of those issues, but it was happening. But the Bank
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was looking for an operation to test it's emerging response to rapid urbanization, and
Senegal appeared to offer the opportunity for this. In addition, there was the fact that
Senegal had been the heart of the French colonial empire, it had the first university and
the best trained local staff in francophone Africa, and the Senegalese were well able to
talk architectural and planning issues with the Bank.
In West Africa, till about 1978-79, the approach was almost completely oriented towards
shelter. This was partly due to the droughts and partly to the oil shock. They led to
massive migrations, and the question was, how are people going to cope. So the
concerns upto that time were essentially number oriented, how many. how much. That
led to questions of affordability, that if this is where these people are located
income-wise, how much can they pay, and to issues of replicability, or how much more of
the same thing can be done with the same amount of initial funding.
From the Bank's point of view the main issue was numbers too, because there were a0I.
of problems initially. getting these projects off the ground, and it was important to get as
many projects in place as soon as possible, to test and demonstrate the concepts that
had been tentatively focussed on.
But the major problem in West Africa, and probably elsewhere in the post colonial world,
was the issue of standards.The colonial legacy left by the French, the British and others,
both in terms of institutional structure and in terms of the locally unrealistic standards of
housing introduced by them, left an entrenched mind set that had to be worked around.
Strangely, the problem was easier to neutralize in the francophone countries than in the
anglophone ones', perhaps because when the British moved out of their colonies, they
left the basic institutional practices in place, while the French and the Belgians tended to
pull out lock stock and barrel. They would even pull out telephone systems and things
like that, which meant that there was no local institutional capacity to carry on, but it
certainly made it easier to change the institutional structure. But that is a very simplistic
view, because there were many other factors at work at the same time.
In two respects, Senegal is the consumate example of this situation, past and present.
It's architectural schools were steeped in the traditions of the Beaux Arts, and its shelter
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institutions conditioned to seeing buildings as beautiful artifacts. But they were
amongst the first to agree to the lowering of standards tentatively proposed by the Bank.
How much of that was due to the dynamic of the relationship between the Bank and the
borrowers is another kettle of fish, but they djiagree to lower cost standards. Not in the
sense that "low-cost" is used today, but then at that time the public agencies were barely
adressing the top 10% of the population. The Senegal project clearly-stated that it was
aimed at the target group that was above the population that can't pay anything, who
would just have to rent as best they could, but below the levels handled by the existing
upper and middle income agencies (which, in fact, were targeted merely at the upper
income groups). The corporate memory at the Bank may deny that, because a lot of
careers were made or broken on the Senegal project, but that is how it happened.
It was very clear at the start that Senegal was a middle-income housing project, even
though it was sold, within the Bank, as a low income housing project. All along, the
standards the Bank was Imposing (and it wa an imposition), were just unacceptable to
the twenty-odd francophone countries in West Africa. What happened was that the
Bank was arguing this low-cost basic approach, based on incomes and ability to pay, but
the governments didn't really agree. Their agenda was to "improve the lot of their
people", and this whole business of no toilets, just a hole in the ground and so on, just
didn't fit into their political agenda.
The other problem was that institutions like the power and water companies had
standards written indelibly into their bye-laws that simply excluded the acceptability of
such projects, and there was not the political will or institutional inclination to make the
effort to change or circumvent such regulatory mandates. The on the ground realities
were simply too different from the original appraisal report, and many years were spent in
negotiating policy on standards even after the projects themselves had been
negotiated and implementation had commenced.
At the Bank, the early sites and services projects had evolved conceptually and
intellectually with reference to a number of issues: low-cost services, people paying
only for what they can pay for because the level of services have been tailored to their
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levels of income, people paying for services only when they see them delivered, that
they will build and invest in their own housing only when they see that their claims to the
plots have been legitimised. But this was largely an intelectual exercise which, on the
ground, proved to be extremely hard to implement.
Probably the single most critical block was the issue of lowering standards. Governments
would initially accept what the Bank was pushing, but come implementation time and
they would almost always baulk. Mali, Bokina Faso, the Ivory Coast, almost everywhere
there was atleast a five year lag in projects while such policy issues were being
discussed.
on the applications of evaluation............
In one sense the first phase in Bank operations in the field of shelter was this Intellectual
phase, where assumptions were made away from the realities of implementation, without
the willing or explicit consensus of recipient countries, and the projects fell flat. The next
phase was what Michael Cohen called Learning by Doing. And we were learning by
doing it out in the field. But there was a very distinct lag, within the Bank, between the
lessons that were being learnt by project officers and the learning by the managers who
were sitting here in the Head Office.
In the late '70s there was a major evaluation effort on four Bank funded projects, of which
Senegal was one (Senegal, El Salvador, Lusaka, Nairobi), because McNamara had
promised the Board that there would be a rigorous evaluation of shelter projects before
fututre policy was determined. But, the question is, what was the Senegal evaluation
worth? There was no discussion or consultation with the people in the Bank who actually
worked on the project, who had struggled through a very difficult implementation
process. There was no attempt to understand what had gone on before the project
actually hit the ground.
The Bank, in fact, had tried to close down the Senegal project in 1976 or thereabouts,
because it was felt that it wasn't working. There was, at that time a factional split. One
group insisted it be wound up, and the other insisted that the Bank was in the business
of facilitating implementation, and since the Bank was just starting off on shelter issues, it
31
should accept apparent failures and then move to more appropriate strategies. But it was
an extremely rigorous evaluation of the four projects, costing millions of dollars. At that
time there was a seperate Research Department, unconnected to the Urban Division,
which created a research design, identified teams, and went out to conduct the
evaluation without any inputs whatsoever from the people who had actually worked on
the project.
[Was it the project staff that was being evaluated, rather than the projects themselves?]
The people who run evaluations, whether Bank staff or consultants, very often don't
have too much field experience, which may sometimes make the evaluations either
incomplete, in a project specific context, or unrealistic, in an implementation context.
This was the case with the evaluation of the Senegal project. There were reams of
reports that were put together about it, but what the evaluators failed to acknowledge
was that at the time the evaluation was done, there was nothing to evaluate or monitor,
because in 1976 when this evaluation exercise began, (the project officially began in
1972), all the project was was 400 hectares of sand.
The project was supposed to have been completed in 1980 with 10,500 plots, which in
Bank parlance means there should have been 100,000 people on the site by 1979. But
there were things wrong with the design, there were wrong procedures being used,
people who were conditioned to seeing a 'house' as having 4 to 5 rooms were being
offered a one room unit, there were socio-cultural mismatches, and so on. A lot of the
project staff argued that it was simply the wrong stage of the project to be doing an
evaluation that adressed itself to issues of success versus failure, but that the evaluation
should, in fact, look at why things happened the way they actually did, at the riaL
process.
Probably the most critical factors in any evaluation exercise are the time at which it is
conducted and the motives for which it is done. When is one evaluating and for what
reason. Very often, as in Senegal the criteria should have been why things were
happening the way they were, rather than what had been happening. The fact is that
there really wasn't anthing to monitor, and the project staff knew it, and asked for an
evaluation that questioned why people were n=. moving onto the site; the sand dunes
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had been leveled, the roads were there, there was some water supply even though the
electricity was not laid on till later, people were desperate for land, they wanted a plot no
matter how, and they 51iWl did not move in. That should have been the focus of the
studies.
The major problem with evaluations is often this 'success vs. failure' syndrome. For
instance, by the time the Project Completion Report on the Senegal was finished
around 1980, the project had been conclusively adjudged to be a 'failure', both within
the Bank and in the Government. The project staff knew that there was no way top
management in the Bank would even look at another sites and services project in
Senegal.
But a phenomenal investment had been made, very many innovations in policy had
resulted from the project, the first sites and services project, the first structural
adjustment loans, a core of people had been built up within the implementing authorities
who now knew what the problems had been and had ideas about how to circumvent
them, there had been a recognition of the need for municipal training and management,
the project had served as the testing ground for a number of theoretical, academic
ideas, and contributed to the body of knowledge both within and outside the Bank.
So what does the concept of 'failure' mean? Because there are now, today, 100,000
people living in the project. It's not just a question of bom evaluations are done, or even
WL.aI is being evlauated, but when are these evaluations done. Projects and programs
are organic entities. They are not static in time. They have a life of their own and the PCR
certainly does not mean that the project has ended with any kind of finality. What was
observed by the evaluation yesterday cannot reasonably be expected to hold true
tommorow.
At the time it became clear that the Bank would not touch another project in Senegal,
there was the begining of talk amongst the project implementation staff about the
problems with maintainance. There had been incredible investments made in in roads, in
water, in infrastructure, in shelter, but upkeep was begining to show up as a real
problem. The project staff felt strongly about the Bank not continuing its investments in
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Senegal Part of the reason for wanting to push further investments in Senegal was the
perceived opportunity costs of not continuing to participate in the development process
there; partly because there was a concern for the country, and partly because they felt
that the government would go back to doing high-cost high-standard upper-income
housing if the Bank did not continue to manifest its presence. So they put together a
Technical Training Program aimed at adressing the issues of Urban Management and
Institution Building. And the way in which the idea was 'sold' within the Bank, was by a
technique that might be called "working the corridors", building up supprt for the ideas
over lunch and coffee, trying to gradually bring the loan officer to see that the project
made sense.
The major issue with cost recovery was not that the Urban Division was not aware of it
initially. In fact, the only way project staff could get the management of the Bank to make
the $3,000,000 commitment to the second project was by guaranteeing full cost
recovery and affordability and full occupancy. But it failed to achieve these targets,
largely because the government of Senegal was not commited, politically, to these
issues.
on learning lessons.............
There is both a sector specificity and a region specificity to the evaluations of the initial
projects that precludes the possibility of any kind of comparative analysis or appraisal.
And perhaps that is why the Bank took so long to draw generalisable principles or
lessons out of the early projects. It is uncertain whether the conclusions of those first
studies ever truely got incorporated into Bank policy. Each of the projects was assessed
by different groups., but the Senegal team came to its own conclusions, the El Salvador
team, the Zambia team, the Nairobi team, the Phillipines team, all came to their
independent conclusions. But there is no real integration between the regions, and it is
hard to see how broad policy-forming decisions could be made on the basis of these
studies because the contexts of the different projects were so very different.
This is one of the major points that is most often not taken into account by evaluation
exercises within the Bank: that there Is a real need for integrating findings, that .1Il this
can be done successfully it is not possible to use evaluations for policy-formulation, and
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that what is true in one case, may not be so in another. Lessons were transmitted
through the organization alright, but the question is with what speed and how much
friction.
There are structural problems within the Bank that have their own rules. The fact that
people who work on one region are pretty much isolated from people in other region
groups, has its own effect. But then there is Dunkerley's housing policy paper which
came out in 1975, which effectively set the Bank's Urban shelter policies on the basis of
the "experience" it had accumulated upto that time. It was a comprehensive piece of
work, almost a bible for Bank strategies, but how many project people carried it around in
their pockets? In fact, there were so many pressures out there in the field that probably
few of the staff that should have absorbed it actually did, largely because there was so
much else to do.
It is difficult, maybe impossible, to seperate things out. The whole development of the
Urban Division is a complex fabric of institutional objectives which have shifted with
changes in leadership, management objectives which are a product of the individualistic
interpretation of the perceptions of policy and Board objectives, the objectives of the
particular countries and their particular priorities, and the interaction between country
needs and the project teams that are working at the micro-level, the nature of the sector
itself, evolutions within the Bank itself, what vested interests were operating peripheral
to the various projects, all of these factors make policy emerge. Rational Change d
take place, but it happens very slowly. The major issue then becomes the speed with
which change occurs, rather than anything else.
The processes and approaches within the Bank are certainly a result of lessons learnt,
but a lot of the lessons learnt are a result of responses to non-project related pressures
that are both internal and external to the organization. One of the critical questions for
the Urban Division, seems to have been, "how do we continue to operate". The Bank
seems to be built on interest groups that have a vested interest in perpetuating their
own fiefdoms.
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on organizational culture............
One of the problems with the way the Bank is set up, what with the staff being based in
D.C. and making all these trips out to the countries in which the projects are based is that
it leaves very little time to keep up with what is happening in the Central Office. It's not
clear who actually listened to that work, other than the academic community.
Very often project officers are driven by a need to survive. There is a very real need to
anticipate the management level, a need to ask "what do we Ibink they want". And that
could well be one of the major motivations for innovation. In Upper Volta, for example, in
1977, there was a recognition, by the project staff, of the fact that maintenance could
well prove to be th& problem. And that was probably the first time that municipal
capacity-building was explicitly built into a Bank project, largely because the project staff
was concerned about anticipating questions that might be asked by the Central office. A
lot of the decisions taken in the field are often the direct result of project staff wondering
what sort of questions management will ask, and trying to outguess those mindsets. A
sort of "what do I think that he thinks that I think I should be up to" syndrome.
Then there is the 'rites of initiation' syndrome. The proving of self. This can be a major
factor in the way in which project staff respond to situations, and often decisions that are
taken in the field are far more a product of satisfying the perceived demands that might
emanate from management staff, rather than any kind of a rational decisionmaking
process. Project officers have to prove themselves in order to 'get their feathers', so
they need to play devil's advocate when they are on a mission. And there is no rationality
built into the process. Michael Cohen was complemented by McNamara for introducing
the Urban Management component, even though it wasn't called that at the time. In the
end the whole package went belly-up, but none the less the whole thing looked super,
because it had been packaged so well, and because a number of issues had been
addressed in the process.
A number of the project staff dQ. have a particular vested regional interest. There are
hidden agendas. specific area concerns, and personal biases that colour the
complexion that projects end up taking. But perhaps, even more critical, is the fact that
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very often the most basic concern that motivates and control the decisions taken by
project staff, is the plain and simple desire to survive within the political heirarchy of the
organization.
This survival instinct has possibly been stronger in the Urban Division than in other parts
of the Bank, largely because Urban is seen to be the "cowboys" of the Bank. People
there are less traditional, and they have very different professional backgrounds.
Whereas most people in the Bank are economists or bankers, the Urban Division used
to have mainly planners and architects. In the beginning, the kind of staff that was
employed was very different from Bank norms. They were less traditional, there were
more women, people with less of an hardware oriented focus. They wern't bankers, they
wern't engineers, they wern't economists. That introduced a whole new species of
people into the Bank, which may or maynot have made the Urban Division just a little bit
suspect in the eyes of the general policy staff.
It was not, however, a case of people in the different regional groups merely trying to
legitamize their existance within the Bank. After all, the people employed by the Bank
come from all over the world, not just the west, and they had a real desire to serve their
countries. The Bank does tend to go in and push countries around. So when project
staff, either out of genuine affection for a context or out of sheer chauvinism, try to do
something that is born of a desire to do what is 'right for the context', and when that
particular notion is at odds with the Bank's agenda, there are bound to be problems.
And there was a very real, if unstated, or even sub-conscious, need on their part to make
themselves perceived to be relevant within the context of 'normal' Bank operations. That
was definately one of the reasons why the Technical Assistance program Urban
Management and Rehabilitation in Senegal was formulated.
There has been a very distinct and drastic shift in the kind of people who are being hired
within the Urban Division today. Most of the previous staff, the project officers, the policy
research people, the operations and evaluation people, even some of those who have
risen to management positions, probably would never have got into the Bank if current
parameters had existed in the past.
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This does affect the directions that policy is taking. An alternative scenario could be that
the kind of people coming into the division now are a reflection of these shifts in policy.
The Bank is now looking for financial analysts and institutional experts. There is a much
greater emphasis on "software" issues, the computerization of municipality records,
cadaster surveys, fiscal issues, mandated macro-level cost recovery techniques through
the taxation process, city-level tax base readjustments (even though it is questionable
whether it is possible to in fact generate any greater revenues by such an approach),
urban land management systems, financial intermediation, information systems, and
other such management type actions across the board.
on western political Influence............
There is little doubt that the U.S. Govemment has had considerable say in the directions
that projects and programs take. Partly this is due to the fact that the Bank is physically
and conceptually located in Washington, but also because very often it finds itself,
esspecially in the field of shelter, working with U.S.A.I.D. which, after all, Is controlled by
Congressional mandate, and their restrictions have influenced how the Bank has
operationalised projects. A.I.D. is constrained by its Housing Guarantee Program to lend
to the 'poor, and the Bank has long since decided that one can't j.I lend to the poor,
because everybody is poor.
38
INTERVIEW #5.
on the equity motivation for strategies............
One of the major impacts of the sites and services projects was that they were a
phenomenal means for capital accumulation for the 'poor, something like a one-shot
lottery, mainly because such projects meant a redistribution of land ownership within
urban areas. Because this was one of the economic motivations for getting involved in
the field of urban shelter in the first place, to balance out the economy, to reduce the
economic disparities across income groups, to encourage a more balanced growth and
power structure through the population spectrums, is basically why upgrading projects
and even unserviced sites projects began to receive more emphasis after a while than
sites and services. Even though the latter had worked in this regard, and projects were,
by and large, reaching below the 50th percentile, the former were seen to be effective
ways to reach even further down the scale.
on western political Influence............
Given the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, and the fact that the initial proposal to set up the
Bank (IBRD,IMF) originated in the U.S. and had to pass Congress, that the Executive Directors,
though not American, reside in Washington, that the President of the Bank is always an
American, means that the U.S. has certainly a major say in the directions that Bank policies and
strategies take, if only by implication.
The direct influence of the U.S.Government on directions within the Bank has been
indirect. Very often the Bank works in conjunction with U.S.A.I.D. on projects, and they
are controlled by Congressional mandate, and this does affect the way in which Bank
projects get structured.
But it is control by implication, and more important than govenmental influence, perhaps is the
politico-economic atmosphere in Washington. But the Bank is, economically speaking, a
Keynsian product, and has always worked towards the stabilization or creation of 'market forces'
as the primary control mechanisms of an economy.
on the evolution of strategies............
Probably the two basic strategies in the field of urban shelter in the Bank, right from the
start, have been land acquisition and privatization. A lot of effort has been spent on
working out ways to modify or improve land policies, and to take the burden of
development off the public sector, because no matter how effective the public sector
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may become, the Bank believes that the private sector will always be far more efficient in
the provision of a lot of these services, particularly shelter. And the private sector Is
beginning to get involved in the provision of low-cost, low-income urban shelter. For
example, in the first Madras sites and services project, the Bank showed by
demonstration that such shelter projects could be structured to make financial sense,
and the private sector did take over a considerable part of the burden of development.
It is not possible to use any kind of data to analyse the progressive development of
implementation strategies espoused by the Bank. If one is out sailing and the weather
changes in unanticipated ways, one has to respond in a spontaneous way, and the
appropriateness of the response is a function of one's level of expertise.
When the first demonstration projects began at the Bank, there was no way to anticipate
the oil crisis and the phenomenal inflationary pressures that it created, the drop in real
incomes, the incredible increase in fiscal burden on governments in terms of
energy-related costs, and the drastic jump in national debt. So even though the basic
approach to the issue of urban shelter was chalked out in the 1972 Sector Policy Paper
by Grindley and Merryl, and notionally has followed that direction, there are too many
unpredicted, even unpredictable, externalities that influence the implementational
details of most of these conceptual approaches.
One of the major controlling factors in the direction and impact of projects that most
conventional evaluations don't take into account, is the personalities of the key people
involved in these projects, both in the Bank and in the country. The Madras urban
project is one such example, where it was the vision of the project officer and his
perceptual abilities and familiarity with the country context that made that project work.
In the Nairobi project, on the other hand, it was one of the Kenyans who came up with a
critical perception. His contention was time-based, in the sense that he argued that even
though an idea may be unacceptable to the current generation in any context, if it was
pushed anyway the strategy would become the norm, and the next generation, or the
one after that, would accept it far more readily. Which means that time can be a critical
element in the acceptance of any new or unconventional strategy. It took a one
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generation shift before the idea of lowered standards became effective, and maybe that
is inevitable. The issue of land titles was talked about for a very long time, and there were
any number of negotiations between the Bank and the Kenyan authorities on the
issues, but it was not until a new. younger generation of professionals and citizens
appeared that the idea was accepted. Today standards is just not an issue in Kenya. It's
accepted as a norm, as is the concept of privatization, and land reform, and all the other
things needed to meet the rising demands for urban shelter and economic growth.
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INTERVIEW #6.
on organizational structure............
Each of the regional bureaus' at the Bank is self-contained. The advantage of that is that
if one wants information on one particular country or region, one does not have to go to
a number of departments within the Bank. Above these is the central project staff that
holds a generic overview of what is happening across regions. Under the regional
bureaus are three departments: the projects department, and the two country relations
departments. But within these, there are about ten sector sections. So each of these
regions has an Urban division, which concentrates specifically on Urban issues within
that particular region.
on the application of evaluations............
There are useful outputs of formal evaluations, over and above the project-specific
reports that are written. For instance, The Learning by Doing paper is a good example of
applied evaluation. In terms of methodology, however, evaluation can become a very
complex process. In the first generation of sites and services projects within the Bank, in
Zambia, Kenya, and El Salvador [n.b.: Why was Senegal not mentioned. Is it in fact an
instituational taboo as mentioned in Interview # 4, or just a slip] . Instead of getting the reports
done in a year and getting the results out so that they could be used, a very elaborate
and ambitious five year program was set up, with the intention of compiling as much
empirical evidence that could be used to vaildate certain hypotheses the Bank's urban
shelter program began with in 1972.
Another essential point about evaluations is when the snapshot is taken. Five years
back, the project was a failure, today the community has developed to a point where the
project must be said to work. Similarly, in Tanzania, there were sites and services
projects and upgrading projects that were said to be dismal failures, which today are
economically extremely active communities. The activity of this 10,000 household
community, which means 100,000 people, can directly be linked to the initial provision
of such basic infrastructure as roads and water. Of course every Bank project has its
successes and failures, but there is no question that the Central Department in the Bank
holds a reasonably balanced picture of what's happening out there in the field.
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on lessons learnt..............
One of the objectives of the Bank's shelter program was to reach the poor, those who
did not have access to conventional market delivery systems. The primary concern at
that time, which was a result of a lesson learnt, was that some mechanism be found to
prevent the targeted group from selling their sites to higher income groups. There was a
major effort to constrain resale by use of conditionalities, and also to attempt to block
renting, which was seen to be a covert mechanism to transfer property "under the table".
However, it was found that the policing required to ensure this was so very elaborate that
it was impractical to implement. But more importantly, there was a realization that this may
not be the best way of "reaching the poor". There was a feeling that the most effective
ways of reaching down the income scale was by inreaing the supply of shelter options
and reducing the existing gap between supply and demand.
There was finally an acceptance of the fact that the 'poor' should have the option to sell
out, because their priorities on the use of capital may be different, and it may be more to
their advantage to have this option to accumulate the kind of capital they need most.
Similarly, it was gradually accepted that renting was a valid and beneficial expression of
monetary need, being a major source of additional revenue, and often provided the
much needed capital for the physical consolidation of the structure and for future
growth.
[But how much of this is post-rationalizatIon to jiutify getting around what was seen to be an
inherently uncontrollable phenomenon that called for more effort than it was worth in terms of the
end result, and how much of it is genuine lesson-learning ?].
on the learning of lessons............
It is almost impossible to distinguish between "formal" and "informal" evaluations in the
context of lesson-drawing. In El Salvador, for example, there was a formal project
evaluation, but in Tanzania the evaluation took the form of discussions with the project
unit. When a Bank mission goes out to the field and is told that the project unit's
experience is that the overwhelming majority of the beneficiaries wants to rent, then the
Bank will begin to question the wisdom, the logic, of trying to prevent renting.
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One of the objectives of the Bank is to meet the "real needs" of the poor, and if one of
their real needs is the creation of additional income, and renting provides it, why should
the Bank try to block it. In addition, there was the realization that the renta of a part of the
provided dwelling, in fact adds to the stock of housing units, thereby reducing the gap
between demand and supply. After all, it's not just finished owner-occupied housing
that adds to the housing stock, renting is a very real and valid phenomenon. The new
issue that then needs to be addressed is, is there a way to reduce the rents, so as to
increase accessibility to, and the affordability of, such units? And the only way to do that
seems to be by reducing the gap between supply and demand.
on the evolution of strategies............
The whole concept of affordability is linked to the issue of cost-recovy. which stems
from the need for replicability. "how, with limited resources, does one do more of the
same". It's not just a question of internal rates of return.
But this connection is either not seen or, for political reasons is not expedient, and there
was a real need to demonstrate to local authorities that cost-recovery was an
implementable concept. The first generation of projects within the Urban Division were
mainly demonstration projects, designed more to show that it could be done rather than
that this was the 'right way' to do it. The intention was to put in place an Institutional
machinery and the financial mechanisms that could then take over the technical aspects
of implementation. These were small scale projects, perhaps a 1000 units each,
intended to demonstrate that if the countries wished to run projects of 10,000 units, It
could be done.
In the second generation of projects, a jump was made from pilot projects to programs. In
Kenya, for example, the first project had 6,000 units, the second project had close to
20,000 units, while in the third the number goes well over 50,000 units. By then there
was no need to get involved in the nuts and bolts of implementation. There was a credit
agencv in place that was going to provide beneficiaries with the loans, the infrastructure
was going to be handled by the local municipality, and all that had to be done was to
urbanize the land in the first place, provide some financial support, and then pull back
and watch It happen.
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The Urban Division began by designing extremely small turnkey projects, looking into
every single detail of the site, the community, the city, working out community facilities,
roads, sewage, infrastructure, recovery mechanisms, every requirement of this
neighbourhood, down to the last door-knob. At that point the Bank would invest
$50,000 to generate say 5000 units that would benefit 5000 families. Most of the
procedures., such as the allocation of units, the screening of potential beneficiaries,
were extremely elaborate.
As a result of the first generation of projects and the knowledge they helped build up
locally, it has become possible for the Bank to move out of the product orientation of it's
urban policy, to what could be called the principal elements, which may be summed as
land, credit, and Institutional and human resource Inputs that go into such projects.
Instead of identifying the site the Bank could say that, for example, the city of Nairobi has
500,000 low income people. If a credit agency could be set up that was able and willing
to extend loans to these people, a housing bank that would not restrict access to them
on the basis of unrealistic, though not uneconomic conditions, if any such person could
come to such an agency, meet the three basic criteria of income, some assets, a regular
(if informal) job, irrespective of whether it's a World Bank site or not, that would be useful.
So the first move in Bank strategy could be seen to be a move away from 'building the
core', to providing access to credit. The second thing that happened was that the Bank
began to look at the city as a whole, to try to identify such land as was suitable and
available for residential use, because availabiity of land and it's aquisition was beginning
to show up as the major obstacle to development.
Then the Urban Division would only concentrate on those elements of the project that
could not be handled by the local or city staff, such as land aquisition. trunk sewers.
water mains. The Bank would select five sites within the city, help urbanize them, and
leave the rest to project personnel or private individuals. And this did reduce the cost of
the plot to the beneficiaries, while ensuring that none of the critical elements of a project
were blocked due to the incapacity of the individuals to provide capital intensive
facilities.
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Finally there was the issue of ensuring that the city contained within itself the
organizational and institutional apparatus to be able to take over as many of these tasks a
possible. There was a need to set up things like credit mortgage banks, the social
workers, people who can provide field extention services, and once these are built up
the Bank could phase out these activities and concentrate on the more critical elements.
The evolution of Bank funded projects can be seen even in the names of the projects.
For example, the first project was called the Dandora Sites and Services Project, while
the second one was called the National Shelter Program, and the components of the
latter are essentially a credit component. land urbanization. and institutional
restructuring.
[So there has been an evolution, even though the basic strategy was set at the start by the 1972
Sector Policy Paper by Grindley and Merryl ].
The most significant change that occured around the end of the second generation of
projects funded by the Bank was that the debtor countries began to take char of the
projects and to daya the programs, structuring them to meet their financial requirements.
In the beginning, there would be one Bank project here, another AID project there, a UN
project elsewhere, with each project having its own terms of reference. This made it very
difficult for, say, the Kenyans. But now they drive the whole process.
Enough experience has been built up locally for the Kenyans to come to the Bank and
say, "Okay, Bank, you want to help us? How much can you give? Okay, $100,000,000.
Fine, we need $300,000,000 over the next three years to do what MM have in mind. AID
will give us $80,000,000, the Kenyan govemment will put up $100,000,000, and the
Scandinavian government is giving us $20,000,000, and now we have the three
hundred million that we need to do what we want to do." That is probably the most
significant change that has occured in the field of development, that the countries are
taking charge of what is happening, and how the money is used.
The Bank saw its role as one of influencing the earlier policies of the Kenyan
government, for example. There was a perceived need to move them away from their
highly subsidized programs of housing, to non-subsidized programs that would reach
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more people. It is not possible to speculate that the Kenyans would not have moved in
this direction in any case, i of the Bank's intervention. But the Bank certainly
did influence the direction Kenyan policy took, because there is no way of knowing that
without Bank intervention the Kenyan housing authorities would at have continued to
do exactly what they had done for the past thirty years.
In a way this has been a world-wide phenomenon in which the Bank has played its role.
In the early '70s, Turner was beginning to be heard, and the Bank pulled him in for five
years to help direct potential directions the Bank might take in the field of Urban shelter.
At that time there was no other agency working on sites and services. And that is
significant.
It is a fact that the Bank has moved from sites and services projects to programs, to
sector loans. But there is a reason for that. When the Bank began its urban shelter
program in 1971, the only way the Bank could put it's foot in the dooLwas by giving the
various countries very discrete projects.The Bank started with what were called S.I.L.s',
or Specific Investment Loans, but now they do what they call S.A.L.S.'s, or Sector
Adjustment Lending Sector loans. The important point is that in 1971, the countries
were not ready to sit down and talk about broad urban sector policy reforms, they had to
be talked around to it. Land Management, Munlclpal Finance, Municipal Taxes, Municipal
Administration, Housing Finance, Institutional Restructuring, were all issues that had to
be raised.
It was neccessary for the Bank to try to tell the Kenyans that it was not wise for them to go
through the ten year experience the Bank had already gone through. because it had
been a very e process, that what they ought to be doing is modifying their
urban policies so that they could control the growth of urban areas, figure out ways to
provide non-subsidized-elements, but if the Bank had started with that approach, they
would have slammed the door, because they just were not ready for such ideas. So the
Bank just had to say, if this is the foot in the door, let's make use of it, because one must
start somewhere.
[But, perhaps even sector lending is not enough. It is, arguably still a very 'leaky' process, with
an inordinate amount of diffusion of limited funds. Perhaps the next step will be a full scale
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concentration on national level land banks and housing finance agencies that impose the
minimum of conditionalities, even on country loans instead of sector loans].
on the sources of change............
Most of the real changes that have occured in Bank strategy over the years are largely
extermal, in the sense that Bank staff does not sit behind closed doors and
conceptualize. There are two sources for change. When a project person runs a
hundred million dollar project that is a hundred million dollar mistake, he had better learn
very quickly from it, or else. The Bank has to live with its investments, from inception to
post-completion. The Bank is not in the business of 'giving away money' to countries, it
simply tells the country that once a project has been approved, an account is open in the
Bank for the country to draw on retroactively, once the project is complete. So the Bank
has to live with its projects, and learns very quickly from experience.
The second input is the economic reality out there. The economic conditions of most
coutries are in a constant state of flux, the resources available change daily even though
the Urban sector is not as stark as industy or agriculture. A change in the price of oil has
drastically influenced Bank policy in the past.
on western political Influence............
It is not possible to substantiate any correlation between shifts in the Bank's policies and
shifts in U.S. Government policies. There is no doubt that the U.S., as a country, does
have an effect on Bank's resources, but there is little influence that the government has
on the policy of the Bank. Supply-side 'Reaganomics' is only a policy of thia
administration, but the Bank has been following that for the past forty years. It has always
sought market solutions to everything, always been against subsidised programs as a
matter of principle, always been driven by internal rates of return.
Cost recovery has, in fact, been de-emphasised since the start of the Bank's
involvement in urban shelter. In the beginning, it was the center piece of the division's
policy. The sector papers between '71 and '74 refer constantly to the need for cost
recovery. But there has been an adaption of this policy, and the Bank began to see that
over-emphasis on cost recovery as an end in itself was compromising other things.
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The shift was from saying "these 6000 units cost a $1000 each, so demonstrate to us
that the full amount can be recovered", to saying "can we ensure that the city, .a5a
whole. does not lose out on the project". The concern then became that property taxes,
water tariffs, and so on reflect true costs. But cost recovery is certainly not a new
concept. Twenty, thirty years ago in the agriculture sector, the same concerns were
there. It's just that the Urban sector is relatively new, and it takes time for issues to come
to the fore. But the economists at the Bank have always insisted that cost recovery be
made a requirement of the Urban operation. Its a little bit like health and population
control, in that it is very hard to balance benefits and costs, but even in such fields the
Bank needs some indication that the investment is bringing in some returns, in one form
or the other.
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INTERVIEW #.
on the evolution of strategies...............
One of the questions posed by the Policy Research Division was, what would have
happened to housing and housing markets if the various governments, the Bank, and
other such agencies, had done nothing to intervene. What kind of housing would
people have, what proportion of their budget would it consume, what would the
standards of infrastructure be, what sort of patterns of tenure would emerge.
Having established such a generic description of how housing outcomes and
infrastructure outcomes are related to broad parameters of economic development with
particular reference to market features, one can then say here is what would have
happened if nothing had been done by anyone, now let's compare that to the kind of
interventions that are being proposed by the Bank, or the governments, or whoever.
Whether it is sites and services, or upgrading, or public programs like rent control or
construction of subsidized public housing, how far do these programs move people
away from this behavioral reference.
One of the most striking examples of such research outcomes propably has to do with
the issue of affordability. For years the Bank, and others, had worked on the assumption
that people, everywhere, were both willing and able to spend 20-25% of their incomes
on housing. But empirical evidence from a number of ex-post evaluations of Bank
projects in different contexts began to show that there could not be any such rule of
thumb. Not only did this figure vary across countries, it was seen to vary significantly
between cities in the same country.
The consequences of using such unrealistic figures was either that the ultimate
inhabitants of these projects would be in income groups other than what was originally
intended, or alternatively that the governments would have to commit themselves,
either ex-post or ex-ante, to subsidising the cost of the unit. Alternatively, there would
be other behavioral consequences. There would be increases in density. there would
be subletting, there would be higher levels of turnover as the original beneficiaries
realized that they could sell out and create their own package of housing, goods and
services, rather than accept the unaffordable projects.
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There have been nominal shifts in the Bank's strategies towards urban shelter. In the
late '70s it seemed that upgrading projects were becoming more the norm than sites and
services projects, but this trend reversed itself and sites and services projects forged
into the lead again. In the past three or four years, the emphasis within the Bank has
been on sectoral lending, but the kind of projects this has led to has not been
substantially different from what has been happening all along. The sectoral shift can be
characterized by a greater emphasis on the role of financial intermediaries that ever
before.
There has been a sensing that the most appropriate role for governments to play is that
of facilitator of housing production, rather than a direct producer of housing. Therefore
the most important things to do are to provide financing in a reasonable way, to
concentrate more on land development and infrastructure provision, to implement
policies in land markets.
It is a belated recognition of development economics that the development of financial
intermediaries must have a focus that transcends the narrow objectives of housing, that
they must, in fact, help facilitate the development of capital markets, to enable resourse
mobilization, the conversion of things like jewelry and other tangible assets that have
traditionally been kept under matresses to savings in cash, because this does help to
lower transaction costs for the whole economy. There is a need to raise the rate of
interest for savers, lower the rate of interest for borrowers, and create a climate within
which capital can move more freely from one part of the economy to another.
There are two essential reasons for these shifts in Bank strategy. One is that the Bank
began to realize that the turnkey type of projects were not capable of bringing about the
broad policy shifts it felt to be neccessary. The other, perhaps more important reason
was the change in the overall economic environment of the borrower countries, who
began to express a preoccupation with macro-economic concerns and the relationship
between everv sector of the economy, performances of which began to be seen to be
much more important than ever before.
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One can safely expect that, even though the Bank will continue to be involved with
individual housing projects, quite a large portion of the Bank's lending will be in the area
of sector loans with a heavy emphasis on the development of financial institutions, of
housing credit institutions.
To a large extent, the shifts in Bank strategy are a result of externalities, in the
macro-economic conditions of the countries the Bank deals with. The particular shape of
the evolution of various policies is not too closely related to ideas that were part of the
written policy of the Bank in the Urban areas. These have a rather heavy emphasis on
project specific details; on reducing standards, on recovering costs, on devising
affordable solutions, on replicating projects, on goingupsale. with the idea that
institutional change would occur as a result of Bank projects both setting a good
example, and being replicable in financial terms.
Certainly most of the current issues were raised in the initial documents, but they were
raised more in passing than as explicit issues. and there was no effort to prioritize he
various components, to say that one was more important than the other.
Other than external factors, probably the most important factor that influenced Bank
strategies was a realization on the part of the project officers, the 'doers', that most often
when projects didn't work, it was because the policv framework within the country or area
was not correct, and that the only way to get the projects to work was to first change the
policy structure. It began to be recognized that the policy context was not only affecting
individual projects, but also resource allocation in general, and the efficiency of the
housing sector and the way it contributed to urban areas and to macro-economic
performance.
on learning lessons............
While there is no question that the Bank does learn lessons, as an organization there are
probably fewer modes for lesson drawing than in other organizations of such a size.
There are certainly nt enough retrospective evaluations done within the organization
with the explicit intent to learn from experience,inspite of the "Learning By Doing"
experiment. It's not so much whether the Bank learns lessons or not, as much as how
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long does it take the organization to learn from its activities. The oportunitie. for lesson
drawing are much less, and the modes are much more diffuse, far more interpersonal in
nature, such as the annual departmental get-togethers, where various case studies are
presented. But even then the lesson-drawing is not explicit. It is not a situation where a
bunch of people can sit down and analyse the cases, set up models, test them,
formulate hypotheses, and project into the future.
There was one set of explicit coordinated project evaluations done of the first four sites
and services projects. But, firstly, there just had not been enough projects done to
come to any worthwhile conclusions, and secondly the projects had not been on the
ground long enough to mature to a point where problems might have surfaced far
enough to be skimmed off as lessons learnt.
In the Water Division, for example, there is virtually no econometric evaluation of
projects, largely because the sector is controlled by engineers, who are uncomfortable
with micro-econonic techniques, and who are sceptical of the application of economics
to project design. And there are a number of analogies that can be drawn between water
projects and the shelter activities. For instance, there is consistent use of rules of
thumb, as in the case of affordability assumptions, which are then blindly used as design
criteria. But when these rules of thumb are looked at closely, they are consisten found
to be Inappropriate, either because they are essentially i or because they
are too simplistic and ignore a lot of related and critical factors.
Both in the case of water projects and in the case of shelter programs, long-standing
assumptions about the percentage of income beneficiaries are willing to spend either on
the supply of water or on repayments, have been shown to be inappropriate. Not only
were the assumptions wrong in themselves, there was also the fact that they were given
too much importance as a design index. It can be shown empirically that the 20-25% rule
is more often wrong than correct, and also that the success of a project rarely depends
critically on affordability assumptions, however accurate they may be.
on the techniques of evaluation............
Qualitative evaluation techniques in the 'story-telling mode' are important, but not in
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themselves. One cannot generalize from a sample of one. At the same time quantitative
techniques, in themselves, can be useless, because more often than not one ends up
asking the wrong questions to start with.
The value of qualitative evaluations lies in the fact that they help the researcher build up
a base, to psych up, in effect, preparatory to doing an evaluation. Having heard
anecdotal, participatory type of stories about Peru, and India, and Indonesia, and Turkey
and so on, allows the evaluator to fill in the interstices between sample ranges, to
Interpolate across cases, to decide what findings are actually generalizable
cross-contextually and which are case specific. But in the context of any organization,
there is a very real need to set up and use rigorous analytical models of evaluation that
don't leave too many open ends or questionable findings.
Probably the only time when organizations change direction drastically, as opposed to
evolvLng, is when pressures are brought to bear on it from the outside, when people
outside the organization begin to ask questions about what it is doing, and how it is
doing it. And, quite possibly, it is at that point of time, when these questions are being
raised, that the evaluation information that an organization has compiled, suddenly
becomes important. It may have been getting filed away in shelves for years, not acted
upon, but when such external questioning begins to take place, then potentially such
evaluations become much more powerful in effectuating change.
There are cases where organizations, not merely the Bank, go out of their way to
suppress evaluation reports for fear that they might be 'leaked' to some sort of Group X,
which is out there, wanting to question the activities of the institution. It could be argued
that, given a good, innovative evaluation, there is considerable advantage in having it
actively supressed within the organization initially, so that when there is sufficient
consensual momentum built up 'out there', it can be pulled out of the drawer and
unleashed for maximal impact in terms of institutional change. A pat on the back, and
'this is good stuff', normally means that the report is going to be shunted into a
dead-end. Given that the findings of the evaluation are in fact valid, contention jMan
essential prerequisite to consensus-building.
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INTERVIEW #8.
on the evolution of strategies............
There is a difference between how policies get set in the first place, and how they get
modified operationally. A.I.D. and the Bank have both modified their approaches to sites
and services over time, partly due to external forces, but partly due to lessons leamt, I=
of which have been a result of formal evaluations.
A.I.D. has consciously been trying to readjust it's basic set of priorities for the last four
years, and it's barely beginning to pay off. Change takes time. Ideas nead to go back and
forth. In most organizations, the way in which shifts occur is through the building up of
consensus, which finally does survive far better than any written policy. Rather than
impose a new direction on the organization, the management at A.I.D. began to ask for
new directions. Project staff out there had begun to formulate tentative hypotheses,
and it became possible to set up an international study to evaluate these. In such a
condition, once such a consensus has been built up, the individual becomes less
significant. But the way in which consensus is built, is essentially an informal,
interpersonal process.
In terms of changes in basic strategy, when the Housing Office was set up in A.I.D. in the
'60s, the initial thrust was based on the perception that the problem in housing was a
problem of production, and that production was essentially a problem of technology and
finance. The driving concerns became the transfer of advanced construction
technologies, partly prefab-systems but mainly construction management techniques,
and the setting up of housing finance institutions.
Even though that part of the A.I.D. operation has not changed too much, the next basic
abifl was the result, quite directly, of a legislative Congressional mandate that expressed
a concern for basic human needs in the early '70s. It was felt that since governments
built for the poorest, A.I.D.s emphasis shifted from working with private builders to
working with public agencies. The ideas of upgrading squatter settlements, instead of
bulldozing them, the idea of sites and services, began to take hold, and that was the
area of concentration.
55
The currently evolving theory is really a product of the concept that underlay upgrading,
even though a lot of people don't see it. That theory was that individuals who are
motivated to build, and do go out there to build, can be far more cost-effective than
public institutions. It was seen even then that it was individual effort that was going to
create the housing, and one needed to suport that effort, not block it. The concepts of
privatization, of urban land acquisition really came from. And the important point is that
the Idea was there right from the start of this effort. It was just waiting to be heard. The
age-old concept of 'an idea whose time has come', a building up of enough consensus,
internationally to mobilize resources in what was always there as the 'right' direction.
A lot of what are the present foci of concern within the international development
community are ideas that have really been around for a long time. There are very few
earth-shattering 'new' ideas. The important thing is which of them get talked about,
which of them take hold, which of them prove successful.
But the three basic stages within A.I.D. can be summed up as; a concern with building
technologies, a partnership with governments, and now, saying that neither the public
sector nM. the formal construction industry can produce anywhere near enough
housing, and one has to set up programs to enable the informal sector to produce. This
last is not a new concept. It's just that earlier, in the '70s, the effort was to get
govenments to take over the role and attitudes of the informal sector, while now the
emphasis has shifted to helping enable the informal sector to do what it has proved itself
best able to do. To each according to his sphere of competence.
on learning lessons............
There is only one way in which organizations leam lessons, and that is through
individuals. The way in which it makes adjustments to its approaches tends to be a sum
of individual reactions, it tends to be a product of interchanges amongst people rather
that the result of any formal evaluative studies. The question then is, what sort of
organizational culture does an institution have. Does the organization encourage
people to give dissenting views over the current beliefs, or does it stick by 'given'
principles come what may.
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After all, when an institution has made a policy-based commitment of however-many
billions of dollars, it is going to take a phenomenal impetus to get it to back-pedal and say
"that was a mistake". But then again, there could theoretically be an environment where
it is possible to say "hey, we've all been wrong on this one", as opposed to saying "no,
you're wrong".
Probably the only way organizations can help the learning process internally, is to
generate an environment that fosters the evolution and expression of dissenting views,
and then to take these views seriously until they are actually shown to be incorrect or
inadequate. After all, it is in the nature of the development field that sooner or later,
someone somewhere is going to try out new ideas, new approaches, try to do things
differently. If an organization consistently resists dissention and debate, it will ultimately
shut itself out of the mainstream. But perhaps that is a natural law of selection.
on lessons learnt............
In the context of upgrading, for example, one of the issues that was often flaunted was
that of title. Somehow there was a belief that giving people title to the land was a magic
wand that would solve all problems. But now there is a growing realization that it is not
title to land, per se, that is the issue, but perceived security of tenure. There have been
any number of cases where people a. been given legal title to land and have auijl not
consolidated their properties, because they don't believe that they are secure.
The problem here was the use of the word "title", which was used as a label for a
concept. namely security. At A.I.D. this was one of the few lessons that came out of a
structured evaluation, one that was designed to test a preconceived hypothesis, which
asked " do beneficiaries who have been given title, consolidate dwellings faster than
those who haven't. And the answer was "No". There was no correlation. What was
important was a feeling of 'neighbourhood'.
on the application of evaluations.............
Of course the basic reason evaluations are done is because they are required to be
done organizationally, for fact finding, for accountancy if you wish. The other reason is to
collect data, information on the projects and programs to maintain a running record, a
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historical or archival function. Thirdly, at some level within such organizations, there are
always people who have an intellectual interest in finding out how things that had been
hypothesised actually turned out. And finally, there Is a learning function, however and
whatever form this might take. After all, in the final analysis, if an organization is to
survive, it has to be effective, and to be effective it must evolve, which means it has to
learn.
on organIzatIonal structure............
One of the differences between the way the Housing Office at A.I.D. is structured and
the way the Urban Division at the Bank is set up, is the fact that there are far fewer people
in the A.I.D.'s Washington office. It is physically possible for every professional in the
office to sit down at one table with everyone getting enough time to talk about an issue.
It is much easier to access colleagues, to get to see people, to be less insular in one's
views of one's work.
The other major advantage that A.I.D. gets is by having adopted a 'foreign service type'
policy of rotating all staff across projects and regions. This has three primary benefits.
First, within the organizational culture, personalities are disassociated from the projects.
This means that the project ceases to be an individual's personal activity, and has to
survive beyond the person. This leads to a sense of continuity within the organization.
That is one way to ensure consensus, because there may be changes in style, but the
substance must remain the same, which means that first there must be agreement on
fundamental issues.
In addition, because there is a constantly changing mix of people working on any one
project, a lot more permutaions and combinations of interactive interpersonal
relationships take place. Often this helps to spark off new ideas, new ways of looking at
problems. And finally, it is a very effective way to move ideas and lessons around within
the organization. No one project, no region, no country is ever the same as any other.
By moving from one context to another frequently, it becomes easier to see what is
context specific and what is generalizable.
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INTERVIEW #9.
on the application of evaluation............
Institutions rarely use formal evaluations to formulate policy concerns. More often it is
directed towards project implementation or monitoring activities. At best, formal
Evaluation reports serve the purpose of ensuring accountability and identifying cost
recovery within projects.
It's only when you have an agenda that ties the project directly to the policy agenda at
the Central Office, when the two coincide on a one to one basis, then and only then do
you get formal evaluations that link into the policy efforts and statements directly. At AID,
the way it often works is indirectly, through the GAO audits of the Housing Guarantee
Program to ensure recuperability. Because AID uses loans from the US private sector to
work with Governments on projects that AID devises and designs. AID's interest in
recuperability is due to the fact that it exists on the fees that it charges on the loans, so it
is in our interest to ensure that the loans are solid and operate at current market rates.
In fact there has been very little evaluation, in real terms, been done within the field of
housing except for 'how do we get this project done'. The issues of affordability have
really come out of the early efforts at 'low-cost housing projects' which, in fact, were
middle-class housing projects. It was the recognition of the fact of the lack of affordability
by Turner et. al. that led to some sort of redirection. That was probably the only
evaluation that resulted in a shift in direction, probably the only time any really major
sectoral work was ever done on the issue of shelter.
It's not the formal evaluations that lead to 'getting things done'. That happens inspite of,
not because of, all those people who go around looking at things and talking about
them. The important thing was to get the mid-level technicians to accept that this (sites
and services, or upgrading) was the only way to go, even though theoretically it could be
called substandard, inhuman, unacceptable, undignified. But slowly it worked it's way to
the top. The breakdown has always been between translating the wonderful idea into
physical reality.
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on Institutional procedures.............
With reference to the ways in which AID and the Bank do projects, the techniques are
different but the procedures are similar. The Bank has a first mission, and the mission
devises a project idea and then works on it through the grey cover to the buff cover to
the yellow cover until it finally gets finished. AID works through a shelter sector analysis
to a project identification document to a project paper that then goes through an
implementation agreement, and then the thing get's borrowed. The steps are different
the result is the same: there is a gestation period during which information is gathered
about what is going on in the sector, when opportunities and problems are identified,
are structured into a program, when agenda items and policy issues that may become
the keys to ensuring that the program will in fact flow are recognized, and then the
program is designed and implemented.
The reason why the Bank has a greater lead time than AID is procedural rather than
technical. Their missions move in and out of the countries, returning to Washington
each time, where everyone has something to say about each mission report, while AID
has Regional Housing offices located in the areas within which they operate. It's the
difference between moving back and forth, and between a continuous presence, plus
the difference in organisational structure that makes AID projects move just a little bit
faster than Bank projects.
The Bank has the particular aura, because of it's economists, and it's economic research
and because of all the IRR's it does, that lends a certain technical econometric credibility
to what it does. But AID does do Country Risk Analyses, both because AID has to
protect it's reserve fund and because it has an interest in protecting the recipient
government from getting unduely into debt.
on changing strategies............
Housing projects, site specific orientations, are finished as far as this office is concerned.
There are two basic reasons for that. The negative one is that the project implementation
frustration. The effort that it takes to go through all the details, and the years that it takes
to to get the thing built and inhabited and get the monies flowing, has led people to
believe that donors should finance the programs, and local Institutions should
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implement the projects and use the money according to general guidelines established
prior to the loan commitment.
It means telling Governments that this is what we think you should be doing, do them,
we don't care how, and we'll finance you, otherwise we don't have any reason to keep
talking. We're not going to keep arguing about project specifics, and the size of the tie
beams and the distribution of steel, and the ree-bar size in columns. Let the engineers
argue about that. We need to scale up. We can't be involved with nitty-gritty details
about how to do the stuff.
Lisa Peattie's piece on Sites and Services says this is what you think you're doing, and
this is what it seems you're doing. But it's a critical piece that would be far more useful if it
would suggest what it is that should be done instead. That is what has not come out of all
the evaluations that have been done so far, both within and outside the various donor
organizations.
on western political Influence.............
AID may be more linked to the US political structure than the Bank, largely because it
works under Congressional mandate. The effect of that is that a Senator may go to some
developing country and come back and ask, well what can we do to help that particular
country. Unfortunately the housing program is one of those places they come to
immediately, because they go around and see how horrible the housing is and how poor
everybody is. But other than that, the agendas of AID and the Bank are very close in the
countries in which the two work. The Bank does work in more countries than AID, largely
because of Congressional mandate, due to which AID does not do housing projects in
the Advanced Developing Countries, only in the so-called Less Developed Countries.
But the pursuits of the two institutions are essentially the same. Cost Recovery, the
standards issues, environmental issues, affordability, and so on.
If the US Government has a problem with a proposed WB project, it has it's Vice
President veto it. If it has a series of issues it wants to build into certain kinds of projects,
the Bank, being a multinational entitiy, can't be controlled by a particular kind of
Congress wanting to influence the way business is done, which occurs in AID without
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doubt. But in real terms, what is topical with the Bank is topical with AID, and the end
effects of US Government influence are marginal.
The pronouncements of US Government officials when they talk about what foreign aid
is all about, seems to colour what AID is all about. But there is a group of people in AID
who have a professional interest in what AID is all about. Certainly there are political
appointees at AID, but they are at the Bank too. So it is only the multilateral nature of the
Bank that gives it an Image of independence.
Central Office agendas can often be so very different from implementation agendas out
in the field. This is largely because political needs are often in conflict with project needs.
Also there is a mismatch of time scales, in the sense that political change happens faster
and differently from program agendas. In addition, in AID, there Is the influence of
foreign policy interests.
When there is a Congressional budget cut, the first thing that gets hit Is the Evaluation
process, even though that is a built-in requirement.
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INTERVIEW #10.
on organizational structure............
One of the primary factors that control the way projects and programs are done at A.I.D.
is the decentralization of project officers. Unlike some of the other organizations, such
as the Bank, which are largely operating out of Washington, A.l.D. is broken up into a
number of Regional Housing and Urban Development Offices (RHUDO's), which are
physically located in the regions in which they operate. Quite obviously, what is critical in
Latin America may well be irrelevant in, say Africa or Asia. And because of this
decentralization it becomes possible for RHUDO heads to closely tailor their activities to
their local contexts.
While there could be a number of hypotheses put forward for the true reasons behind
staff turnover [smearing accountability, sharing lessons, broadening experience across
regions, building institutional consensus and organizational culture], probably the most
important is that it is seen, administratively, as a means of reducing the danger of project
staff developing vested interests in local affairs, concems and situations. There is a
school of thought that maintains that when a project officer is out in the field away from
the home office for an extendended period of time, there is the possibility that the
officer's allegiance may either become diluted or be transferred away from the
organizational agenda towards the region or country or city in which he or she works.
The Central Office would typically feel uncomfortable about this possibility. There is a
belief that, being a part of the context, beyond a certain point project officers begin to
develop an empathy for local conditions. They get to know local actors and their
agendas, begin to sympathise with their predicaments, and start to develop their own
personal scenarios of what is best for that particular locality. In the view of the Central
Office, the danger of this is that there could well be a conflict of interest, or even worse,
the engendering of resentment amongst field staff when a particular organizational
directive, born of a wider view, is sent out and does not fit into their perspective of what
should be done. That is probably why, institutionally speaking. it may be better to rotate
staff every so often.
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But speaking strictly from an implementation point of view, the frequent rotation of
project personnel may well be disadvantageous to projects and programs. There is the
'known quantity' syndrome that can work to everyone's advantage. If one is around long
enough, one gets to know the key people, who are the key players, where do they
come out of, what their real interests are, where to give and where to take, these are the
elements of successful negotiations.
Because it is no longer a situation where the donor agencies walk into a country, dictate
their terms, and make their financial support conditional to the acceptance of these
terms. The various developing countries are rapidly developing their own priorities.
There is a build-up in local expertise that gives them the right to lay down conditions of
their own. And there has now to be a quest for a common meeting ground.
The only way to get around this situation would be if the Central office were smart
enough to set up a clear range of fundamental parameters for instance to say " we're
going to concentrate on Credit, Land, and Infrastructure. Now figure out how to do it
whereever you are", and if everybody agrees with this, then the allegience problem is
not an issue. But if the Central office begins to playgames, to change things randomly or
on whim, if it shifts strategies impositionally, or is unduely critical of actions, then it is
inevitable that resentment will follow.
[Prior to the reorganization of U.S.A.I.D. in the early seventies, thare was a socio-organizational
study done to analyse the institution. Out of the then extant body of wisdom, oneof the points
that was made was that if innovation was to be encouraged or fostered in the context of any
operational organization, it was imperative that project staff in no way feel threatened by the
potentiallity of retribution, that the 'sword of Damoceles' was the most effective way of stifling
creativity, that 'reward and punishment', as an organizational control mechanism, do not to
experimentation lead].
The major savina orace of the phenomenon of personnel turnover is that there is
considerable overlapping, so it's not a disaster situation. In addition, the fact that staff
rotates between projects and regions every three years, circumvents any potential
agenda insulation that might result from an excessive regional compartmentalization. It
also means that the Central office can only make basic policy decisions within the
Congressional mandate under which A.I.D. functions.
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Over the past few years, A.I.D. as an institution had decided to strengthen a
decentralized approach to development, and has been delegating more and more
authority to the field, to the mission directors to be able to decide on and even design
projects, without having to first come back to Washington for approval. Of course there
were financial checks and balances, but essentially the heads of the various RHUDOs
were only required to come in post-facto for a review of what actually happened.
But when the Central Office has a strong view on the direction policies and actions
should take, which is so at A.I.D., and the organization becomes increasingly
decentralized, then issues of accountabiity in evaluations become critical. This tension
between strong perceptions at the center and an awareness of the appropriateness of
decentralizing or localizing the decision making process, has led to a reversal in the
trend. There is increasing effort to recentralize more and more of the project design
process, to review proposed actions before they are initiated.
on the evolution of strategIes...........
The basic criterion under which A.I.D. operates, the fundamental mandate, is that it's
programs must be affordable to populations below the median income. Which of course
raises the question of what the median income really is, and what affordability really
means, and that is an imprecise science at best, because it is just not possible to
generalize standards on such issues. Not only do incomes and affordability standards
vary across regions, they vary between countries in the same region, they vary between
cities in the same country, and sometimes they vary dramatically between different parts
of the same city. But by and large A.I.D. projects have successfully ranged between the
50th and 40th percentiles, sometimes even going down to the 35th percentile, even
though the issue of affordability is still an open-ended one.
Nor is there any unanimity amongst project staff on who the true target population of the
Office should be. There are those who argue that it is justifiable to deliver housing to the
30th to 50th percentile, because that is what the Congressional mandate asks A.I.D. to
do. Agruments are made about the trickle-down effect, about the fact that local
governments don't have the political wil or the institutional mechanisms to reach down
any lower than that, that after all some housing is better than no housing. And these are
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all valid enough. But the bulk of the population still lies below the 30th percentile. Can
they be reached or must they be seen to be social welfare cases.
There were some efforts to move away from land projects, pure sites and services, even
site development programs in the context of this population group, and move into very
small scale home improvement loans, credit programs on extremely small lots, and so on.
But even though, in the long run, the intended target population would have benefited
from participation, they often could not see beyond the short term entry costs. Very
often, additionally, those who were part of the informal sector were unable to overcome
either their own fear of credit responsibility, of that of their creditors, in view of the
relatively wide fluctuations in, and unpredictability of, their income streams.
The other major change in basic strategy at A.I.D. has probably been the growing
realization that the large-scale, site-specific, sites and services implementational project
approach of the past years, with A.I.D.s direct involvement in project execution, is
increasingly seen to be a big headache. A large number of the project staff are
convinced that the amount of effort that A.I.D. has to put into project implementation is
just not worth it. Projects in Nairobi, Cairo, El Salvador and other places seem to indicate
that the amount of A.I.D. manpower, time and money needed to get these projects off
the ground, is not commensurate with the end result in terms of the number of units of
housing produced ultimately. What is particularly irksome and frustating to project staff
seems to be that the problems are seen, essentially, to have been identified and
recognized by A.I.D., but they continue to exist locally amongst governments and local
agencies.
At another level, one of the major shifts in AID policy has been in the public-private
domain. Initially AID worked only with the public sector.
[ But in Interview # 8, it is said that A.I.D. began to work with the Public Sector on in the early '70s
because of Congressional mandate, and that prior to that it had worked mainly with the formal
private sector. If different people within an organization have such widely divergent views of the
institutional reality, does this have any implications on the operational effectiveness of the
organization? When 'the truth' Is perceived In diametrically different ways amongst a group of
people (which after all is what y organization really is), then can that group of people possibly
structure a consensus-based common direction for the organization?]
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But the cyclical phenomenon of elections, and the resultant changes in technical and
other key personnel began to be a problem. There was no sense of continuity in
national policies. Often, as in Equador for example, a new government would come in
and change the total direction of housing policies solely because they wanted to show
that they were different from the previous government. This phenomenon was forcing
donor agencies into two roles. First they had behave as the primary implmentation
agents, second they had to resort to financial arm-twisting to make sure previous
investments were not written off without reason.
But the most significant implication of this phenomenon of political inconsistency was
that the donor agencies became the primary receptacles of Institutional memory, rather
than the local organizations. The often phenomenal rate of turnover of local technical
and professional staff forced the donor agencies into a very uncomfortable position. Not
only did they have to shoulder the responsibility for the physical implementation of
projects, but they also became responsible for ensuring that there was a continuity n
the programs. And this was a responsibility that did not belong with them. The whole
intention of the endeavour has always been to fund local agencies to conduct projects.
It was only when, initiallly, it was observed that there was a need to build up skills and
expertise, as well as to help develop institutional effectiveness, that donor agencies
stepped into the breach. But that was only intended to be a stopgap measure, not a
permanent state of affairs.
There are, of course, real problems that exist and can only be resolved over time. In
Ecuador, for example, there was the very prosaic case of filling in the land titles. With
hand written, bureaucratically lengthy titles, and 5000 units, it took a year and a half to
get the job done. Add to that all the documentation required for water supply and
electrical connections, and that is a formula for disaster. It is easy to say, "simple, just
computerize the records", but one cannot walk in with an armload of computers and say
"problem solved". There is a whole way of working that has to be got around. People
have to think differently. approach the problems differently. Computers can be as
ineffective as handwritten forms. That is the basis for the emerging emphasis on
technical assistance and institutional building. They have to be brought up to speed
first.
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And then of course there is a fundamental problem with the donor agencies, the
consultants, and even the theoreticians, in as much as they have a very immature view of
the situation. It is absurd to be as concerned, as a lot of them are, with a "failure to take
care of the 'housing problem' out there". These problems have been around for very
many years, and will probably be around for very many more years, perhaps forever. But
that is not the issue.
The question is what can be done to help the situation in the most effective way [the
concept of satisfising]. How best can one establish realistic rules for the game, and set the
scale of the overall endeavour which needs to be constrained by the absorbtive.
capact, the ability of local institutions to use all the money that is "dumped" on them.
And if they cannot effectively utilize available funds, move the money fast enough, how
can they be helped to do this, what are the bottle-necks, the constraints, the friction
points.
Although there has long been the realization that the public sector is just not able to
meet market demands, and that there would be great benefit in mobilizing the private
sector, this is not possible at present. Domains of action, areas of responsibility are too
deeply engrained to be thrown out of the window. In East Africa, for example, it is
virtually impossible to get anything done except through the public sector institutions.
At the same time there is a curious consistency in the ab-iiy of public sector agencies to
produce housing. Almost everywhere, they have been turning out between 5 and
10,000 units a year at most. If any country claims more, then either the data is flawed or
they are doing things like home improvement loans and counting them as units
delivered, as in the case of Sri Lanka's so-called Million Houses Program.
On the other hand, it is not realistic to look to the formal private sector to step in and
deliver housing to the low income population. They neither like, trust nor want to deal
with the low income population. Not just because there is a cultural bias against poverty,
but because the economic viability or profitability of delivering housing to that section of
the population is suspect in their eyes. But there is no question that the private sector
must be mobilized in some way if any substantial inroads are to be made.
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There are two basic strategies that are being adopted by AID, both based on the
compromised concept of a public-private partnership. The use of Sector Loans, for
instance, is one. It may make sense to spread the implementation responsibility
amongst, say informal actors who can handle 50-100 units rather than relying solely on
those who have the capacity to turn out 5-10,000 units.
This may be one way to mobilize the informal building sector which has, after all, been
extremely effective in its own right. The formal private sector has also, in a limited way,
been mobilized through the use of financial or economic incentives, such as the level of
discount on the cost of mortgages, or by tax benefits. But the essential point is that
some way must be found to create a relationship between the public sector, the formal
private sector, the informal private sector and the international funding agencies.
on organIzational effectiveness............
There is only one way an organization such as A.I.D. could improve it's performance.
And that would be if every single member of the operational staff could be brought to
agree with the essential policy directions, and if there were complete consensus on
organizational strategies. [But....contrast this to the statement in Interview #8..."dissentlon Is
the only way to Innovate and create new Ideas."]. At the same time, this is patently
impossible, because it requires that the central office have a clear consistent policy
across the board. And that can never happen.
Because of regional diversity, it is ridiculous to expect a three sentence policy to say
what the office is all about. At best the central office can prescribe areas like credit, land
and infrastucture to be concentrated upon, but then it hal to be left to each of the
regions to come up with specific strategies. But the dilemma is that there is a limit to
which policy can be generalized within such an international organization.
[And by inversion, there must be a limit to the amount of consensus that can possibly exist within
the institution on the matter of specific implementational strategy].
And then, to make matters even more complex, its not just the A.I.D. staff that has to
agree, even if they merely agreed to focus on these three sectors irrespective of how
the implementation occured. There are the national governments that must agree, there
are the local authorities that must agree, there are the beneficiaries themselves who
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must see a benefit in the options they are being offered. Even the local, national,
international consultants, and the NGOs. must agree on some fundamental issues
before there can be a concerted effort.
on lesson learning............
There are essentially four levels of information transfer within A.I.D. Working top down,
first there are the annual conferences, which are essentially directed by Central Office
staff, where the broader policy issues are discussed by all the staff. Then at the annual
conferences, there are the informal discussions that take place between smaller groups
of the RHUDO staff, where individuals and groups with concurrent interests or problem
foci begin to get together to discuss issues relevant to them. This is probably where the
most significant transfer of information takes place. It is Interpersonal in nature, rather
than organizational, with indiviuals seeking out other individuals who are either known to
have experience about a region or an issue, or are known to have compatible mind-sets
on controvertial issues.
The thIrd level at which there is transfer of lessons learnt in the field is at the bi-annual
RHUDO reviews, where there is a detailed, context specific and in-depth analysis of
particular projects in different regions. When coupled with the pattern of staff rotation, it
could be speculated that these are probably the events at which some sort of
consensus about the cultural identity of the organization begin to emerge. The fourth
level of information transfer, and probably the least important, though not insignificant,
are the formal reports and evaluations that are published. These are not circulated in a
restricted way. Since a large part of the operational staff have moved through, and have
experience of, different regions, all are invited to comment and critique such reports and
documents.
There Is a heirarchical order to the way in which information moves. The 'back-stop'
officers at the Washington office act as a filter between the field and top management.
They are the repository for the larger body of experience gathered by the different
RHUDOs over time. They have the dual function of pooling the sum total of the
organization's experience, from which policy is shaped, and of transmitting the policy
skeleton to the field, where it is then fleshed out to fit local constraints.
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The flow of information is a two way street. For example in Nairobi, a policy decision was
taken, on the basis of information from the field, to initiate technical assistance programs
in the field of housing finance. The problem was perceived at the central office on the
basis of extrapolations made from the various project evaluations that were coming in,
and this was put forward as a strategy to follow. The basic solution was formulated at the
management level. This then went out as a directive to the RHUDO office for them to
work out the specifics of implementation.
Later on there was a reverse flow, when the field staff began to realize that the real or
immediate problem to be addressed was the issue of the local government's
perceptions of standards. They believed that it was the issue of minimal acceptable
standards that was proving to be the major obstacle in improving the housing finance
structure, and they pushed for a focus on that.
[In such a situation it is very hard to decide whether strategy decisions are top-down or
bottom-up. The question becomes, at what point in the evolution of a strategy does one say "this
is when it becomes a decision". There is a perception somewhere, it gets talked about, a
consensual momentum is built, and somewhere along the line it becomes a part of the
organizational strategy. And even then, it is only one of the many different approaches being
used in different regions. This multiplicity of strategies-in-use means that different peoole have
different concepts of which came first and which followed, depending on their personal
experience.]
There are other indirect approaches and long-term potential solutions that have been
instituted over the years which are begining to show some effect. At the informal level,
going right down to the source, there has been a longstanding effort to influence the
structure of courses at local and international universities and schools, to help create a
new sort of professional who can think in appropriate terms rather than design the usual
picture-book architecture. At an other level there is a need to work with N.G.O.'s, private
organizations, consultant groups, universities, technical institutes, an attempt to create
consensus through exposure using seminars, workshops, coursework and so on.
71
CONCLUSIONS: what It really means.
I would speculate that if some one else were to either have conducted these interviews,
or even have listened to them and drawn their own inferences, the results mey well have
been different. But, to me, that is the essential advantage of open-ended interviews.
Interpretive freedom. Something for everyone. Raw, unprocessed information, available
for different people to use in their own ways. However, it seems to me that a number of
issues d. emerge from these discussions.
on the 'evolution' of strategies as a result of lessons learnt...........
The original intent of this thesis was to explore the relationship between evaluation
techniques, institutional learning and organizational effectiveness in the context of
changing strategies in shelter interventions in developing countries, specifically in the
context of two organizations, the World Bank and the U.S.A.I.D. , partly because they
were more accessible to me, and largely because I felt that being physically remote from
their context of operation, the three-way linkage I had envisioned was probably more
critical in operatioal terms.
I decided, fortunately, to use the qualitative open-ended interview technique, rather
than going in with a well-worked out questionaire. The actual decision to use this sort of
approach was not based on any suspicion that there may be more to the matter than met
the eye. Rather it was that I was enamoured by the techniques presented by John
Zeisel, by Michael Patton, by Lawrence Salmen, and by Peter Rossi. My findings, at the
end of the process, more than validate their contentions on the efficacy of qualitative
research techniques.
Because the responses and answers I got were a far cry from what I had expected, both
on the basis of the literature search I had done, and on the basis of statements I had
repeatedly encountered about organizational change.
Probably the single most significant stream of information I unearthed during this
process had to do with the whole issue of "the evolution of strategies" within the Bank.
Time and time again l had encountered statements here at M.I.T., both in classes and in
workshops and seminars, about shifts in policy and strategy within the Bank and at AID,
72
about the gradual movement from finished housing , to core housing to sites and
services to unserviced sites to municipal training to urban management to sector loans,
changes that have been attributed to lessons that have been learnt by these and other
organizations, largely through the evaluation process. In fact my whole thesis was
predicated upon this presumption. As I said earlier, I can only be grateful to the impulse
that drove me to use the research methodology that I did.
Because...........
misconceptions In the mind, as such............
I found something very interesting. First, what I was not aware of was the fact that the
Bank got involved in shelter only in 1972. Second, I discovered that when the Bank was
approached in 1968 to become active in the urban shelter sector, John Turner was
pulled in for a five year consultancy period to advise the Bank on the direction it should
take. There was a sector paper put out in 1972 on Urbanization, written by Grindley and
Merryl, which laid out Bank policy in it's involvement with this field. There are, for me, two
interesting and related points that come out of this paper, which from my point of view,
form the heart of my thesis.
My essential contention at the outset had been that basic strategies and policies at the
Bank and at A.I.D. and in the body of organizations working in the field of shelter
interventions had evolved over time. Working on this assumption, I had gone out there
to attempt to trace a linkage between evaluation strategies, lesson drawing within
organizations, and the mechanisms by which such lessons inform shifts in policy and
strategy.
The source of my initial mind-set was a series of impressions I had gleaned from courses
and seminars and workshops here at M.I.T., and discussions I had had with faculty
members. In addition, I was inspired by Professor Schon's work on Organizational
Learning, and the theories that he presented.
While conducting the interviews, a number of things happened. First, (and this is just an
impression that I formed by intrapolation) I found that all the people I talked to at the
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operational level did not even think about such issues. They were just not seen to be
germaine to the operational activities of the field. I repeatedly encountered statements
to the effect that "look, we were out there doing the stuff". Or alternatively, when I would
ask for examples of lesson-learning being drawn or not drawn into the policy-strategy
framework, they would have to think very hard before they could come up with any sort
of answer.
The second thing that happened was that in virtually every interview, when I asked
whether they felt there had been shifts in policy-strategy, I got an affirmative answer. But
the examples I got related far more to the fine-tuning of strategies already in place. When
I would push for examples of evaluations or lesson learning driving basic policy, more
often than not I was told that those were driven by 'extemalities'.
But most interesting was the fact that at least four of the people I talked to at the Bank,
when asked how policy was set within the organization, would refer me to the 1972
Sector Policy paper by Grindley and Merryl and the 1975 paper by Dunkerley. Although I
got conflicting information on this and cannot verify either the names, sequence, or
dates, I was told that when the Bank was first approached in 1968 with a request that it
involve itself in the field of Urban shelter (which it had not done previously), it
commissioned a study by Turner, Grindley and Merryl to set the direction it should take. I
was told that this paper was the gospel by which policy in the field of shelter was set, and
that "it would tell me all".
The first time the paper was mentioned, I went down to the Bank's bookstore to try to
get a copy, but was told it was out of print. Whenever the paper was mentioned
subsequently, I would attempt to push for a synoptic view of what it had to say. Only one
of the project officer's came right out to say that they had been out there contending
with the real issues, and just didn't have the time to carry it around in their pockets like a
bible which they could whip out and refer to whenever they had a field-based decision to
make. But in all cases, I received no real elaboration.
I finally met someone who, when I asked him about this, gave me his copies of these
papers. I am truely grateful to him. Because, in going through the 1972 paper, I found
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that all the so-called shifts in policy-strategy within the Bank were outlined between
pages four and seven In the Introduction. Each and every single one of the shifts that I
had believed to have occured, or that I had been told had happened, are all mentioned
in the =jmt official policy statement put out by the Bank. And I quote (the underlining is
my own), in sequence.........
"....Rural development in the circumstances ..... may even accentuate migration
to the towns......"
"....to economize in use of resources and increase urban efficiency......."
"....customary standards of urban services not appropriate to prevailing
conditions......"
"....inappropriate pricing and taxation policies......"
"....urban extentions offer opportunities for promoting more economical urban
pattems that would be achieved by continued lassez-falre growth......"
"....The shortcomings of the existing land use regulations, and methods of
public land acquisition present a serious obstacle to more rational urban
development......"
"....it is impossible for most urban inhabitants to afford even minimum standards
of conventional permanent housing......"
....more emphasis of "sites and services" type schemes providing urbanized
.d 
------
"
"....the harnessing of the self-help and savings potential provides the only
realistic possibility for substantial alleviation of housing conditions......"
"....A choice may often exist between services at conventional standards for a
limited proportion at somewhat lower levels but lower unit costs......"
"....pricing policies and taxation incidence acquire a critical importance in
harnessing market forces to produce more rational patterns of urban
growth......"
"....The multiplicity of local governments and autonomous agencies greatly
complicates the problem......"
"....Calculation of economic costs/benefits should be supported by an
assessment of other aspects such as impact on income distribution and
emplovment......"
"....A similar step-by-step approach is indicated towards institution building......"
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"....It is difficult to perceive a better practical alternative to the present ad hoc
decision making process......"
"....The program encompassing some 40 projects and a roughly estimated
$700 million of lending, is necessarily more tentative than in fields where
the Bank has longer experience and extended conections with borrowing
agenie...
"....collaboration will be sought with other agencies with experience in the
field......"
"....Technical assistance on programrming and Institution building is foreseen in
connection with the urban projects.
"....lmprovement of urban management is particularly important......"
"....The several projects in this field included in the program are designed
accordingly for maximum demonstration Impact and institution building......"
"....direct lending for house construction appears of lower priority than for site
and services type of projects which can mobilize self-help, reach the poorer
levels of pupulation and stimulate savings and employment......"
"....improvement of low-income settlements and integrated urban extention
areas that cam both produce economies within the areas selected and
promote more economical patterns of urban growth......"
"....direct lending for house construction is not contemplated......"
"....the Bank Group is prepared to consider lending for seed caital to develop
housing finance Institutions......"
"....The emphasis here is on the leverage effect in promoting savings and
developing capital markets......."
I can well understand my own misconceptions, for they can be said to be a product
of inadequate information, or even misinformation, a view from the outside. But
what I found to be most interesting is that almost every person I talked to, believed
that the two organizations had learnt these lessons over time, that somehow shifts
in strategy had occured as a result of experimentation and "tinkering" and research.
Thequestion in my mind then is, is it that the organization had predeternined policy
and it was just that indiviual implementors had an inevitable need to go 'out there'
and validate or at least re-learn the lessons that had developed this initial policy
statement, or is it that some specific group of people had taken a stand which was
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rejected by the body of individuals that made up the organization, but that over time
the initial policy statement was proven to be correct, or is it that there has been
'somebody up there', watching over developments and ensuring, by various
organizational control devices, that strategies did develop in the way they had been
originally conceived.
But this is probably a matter for further research. For the time being I would just like
to raise these questions as potentialitities. It is personally important to me that I not
try to extra- or intrapolate the interviews, because I believe firmly that each person
who reads them will glean something a little different from them, and I would not like
to take the responsibility of interpreting them any more than I already have.
But in terms of some indicative conclusions there are some points that may well be
made, if only to point out future directions for research. The essential point seems
to be that there is absolutely no consensus, either within organizations or across
organizations, on any to the issues that seem to be germaine to the improvement of
organizational effectiveness. There are any number of individual beliefs on the best
way of improving institutional learning, organizational effectiveness, but there also
seems to be virtually no consensus within the realm of any one of these issues on
the best way of resolving these issues.
Whether one talks about the difference between a centralized operational
structure, as in the case of the Bank, or about a decentralized operation, such as
U.S.A.I.D., there seems to be no way to determine, let alone prove, that one is
better than the other. The issue of project staff rotation, the fact that by and large, in
both organizations, there is a two to four year turnover of staff while average
projects and programs span seven to ten years, is seen by different individuals to
either lead to better projects and organizational performance, or to worse, either to a
discontinuity in the operation or to increased organizational continuity in
performance. et al et al.
Perhaps there is no one correct way to enhance organizational effectiveness,
whether through evaluations aimed at lesson learning, or through organizational
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restructuring. Perhaps there is an inevitability to the "art of muddling through",
perhaps all cats are grey at night and all that organizations can do is thrash around in
the quagmire of life's realities, keep their fingers crossed and take what comes as it
comes. But hope on, hope on.
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